REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		Form Approved OMB NO. 0704-0188

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 04-12-2013	2. REPORT TYPE Final Report	3. DATES COVERED (From - To) 1-Oct-2011 - 31-Mar-2013

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Key Findings for Interpersonal Skills	
	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	W911NF-12-C-0011
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
	1D10BO
6. AUTHORS	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
Kristin Precoda	
	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES AND ADDRESSES	8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
SRI International 201 Washington Road Princeton, NJ 08540 -6449	

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS (ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) ARO
U.S. Army Research Office P.O. Box 12211 Research Triangle Park, NC 27709-2211	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 60683-NS-DRP.4

12. DISTRIBUTION AVAILIBILITY STATEMENT

Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The views, opinions and/or findings contained in this report are those of the author(s) and should not contrued as an official Department of the Army position, policy or decision, unless so designated by other documentation.

14. ABSTRACT

This document describes key interpersonal skills, in the form of knowledge, skills, and attitudes (KSAs), that are trainable and consequential to warfighters in being good strangers. These key skills include observing and adapting to variation in communicative norms; allowing civilian involvement; developing a common understanding of an encounter; acknowledging civilians' autonomy; building rapport; recovering from trouble; and expressing empathy. Also included is a quantitative analysis of the effect of allowing civilian involvement on task completion and

15. SUBJECT TERMS
KSAs (knowledge, skills, abilities/attitudes), interpersonal skills, quantitative analysis

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	15. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Kristin Precoda
a. REPORT UU	b. ABSTRACT UU	c. THIS PAGE UU	UU		19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER 650-859-2388

Report Title

Key Findings for Interpersonal Skills

ABSTRACT

This document describes key interpersonal skills, in the form of knowledge, skills, and attitudes (KSAs), that are trainable and consequential to warfighters in being good strangers. These key skills include observing and adapting to variation in communicative norms; allowing civilian involvement; developing a common understanding of an encounter; acknowledging civilians' autonomy; building rapport; recovering from trouble; and expressing empathy. Also included is a quantitative analysis of the effect of allowing civilian involvement on task completion and civilian cooperation.

Enter List of papers submitted or published that acknowledge ARO support from the start of the project to the date of this printing. List the papers, including journal references, in the following categories:

(a) Papers published in peer-reviewed journals (N/A for none)

<u>Received</u>   <u>Paper</u>

TOTAL:

Number of Papers published in peer-reviewed journals:

(b) Papers published in non-peer-reviewed journals (N/A for none)

<u>Received</u>   <u>Paper</u>

TOTAL:

Number of Papers published in non peer-reviewed journals:

(c) Presentations

Raymond, G., Jones, N., Precoda, K. "Analyzing Police Encounters with the Public: Some Methods for Reducing the Use of Force", UC Berkeley Human Rights Center, Berkeley, CA, November 2013.

Raymond, G. VU University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Formulating the reason for the stop (or not): Knowledge, authority and accountability in Police Initiated Encounters. (Invited Plenary Address) 2012.

Raymond, G. and N. Jones. Las Vegas. American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, Invited Session. Citizens Complain: The organization of authority and accountability in police initiated "stop and frisk" encounters. 2011.

"Just doing business or getting personal?: The personal and the bureaucratic in police-citizen encounters". 2013 American Sociological Association Annual Meeting. Open Refereed Roundtable.

"You can't sit here: The role of help in police-citizen encounters." 2013 American Sociological Association Annual Meeting. Open Refereed Roundtable.

"Emotional specialists or emotional wrecks?: Emotional labor in police-citizen interactions." 2013 American Sociological Association Annual Meeting. Open Refereed Roundtable.

Raymond, G., and Jones, N. "Cooperation, Compliance and Coercion in Police Encounters with the Public: Reducing the use of force." 2013 CUSO Graduate School, University of Basel, University of Neuchatel, Switzerland. Invited Presentation.

Raymond, G., and Jones, N. "'The camera rolls': Using video records to analyze police-citizen encounters." 2013 Department of Sociology, Columbia University. Invited presentation.

Raymond, G., and Jones, N. "'The camera rolls': What video records can teach us about routine encounters between young black men and the police." 2013 Department of African American Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Invited presentation.

Raymond, G., and Jones, N. "Police encounters with the public and some initial observations about conflict, and on the use of force, in them." 2012 Department of Sociology, UCLA. Invited presentation.

Raymond, G., and Jones, N. "Going with the program: Some initial observations on the use of force in Police initiated encounters." 2012 LISO, UCSB

Kidwell, M. "Identity and Place in Traffic Stops: Promoting Common Ground." Paper presented at the National Communication Association Annual Meeting. Orlando, FL. November, 2012.

Kidwell, M. "Authority and Resistance in Police, Military, and Customer-Service Encounters." Panel presented at the National Communication Association Annual Meeting. Orlando, FL. November, 2012.

Kidwell, M. "Police-Citizen Interaction in a Traffic Stop." Data Presentation and Group Analysis presented at the National Communication Association Annual Meeting. Orlando, FL. November, 2012.

"Police as Good Strangers" (MacroCognition)

Logan-Terry, A. (2013, March). "Show, Shout, Shove, Shoot": Interactional Trouble and Remedy in Military Roleplay Training. Paper presented at the American Association of Applied Linguistics annual conference 2013, Dallas, TX.

Logan-Terry, A. (2012, November). Interactional Trouble and Remedy in Military and Police Roleplay Training. Paper presented at the National Communication Association annual convention 2012, Orlando, FL.

Damari, R. (2012, November). Military Officers' Authority and Directives across Contexts. Paper presented at the National Communication Association annual convention 2012, Orlando, FL.

Non Peer-Reviewed Conference Proceeding publications (other than abstracts):

Received   Paper

        TOTAL:

Number of Non Peer-Reviewed Conference Proceeding publications (other than abstracts):

Peer-Reviewed Conference Proceeding publications (other than abstracts):

Received   Paper

08/29/2013   2.00 Neil Hintze, Gary Klein, David Saab. Thinking Inside the Box: The ShadowBox Method for Cognitive Skill
                   Development,
                   International COnference on Naturalistic Decision Making. , . : ,

08/29/2013   3.00 Helen Klein, Gary Klein. Cultivating Good Will Amidst Hostility,
                   International Conference on Naturalistic Decision Making. , . : ,

        TOTAL: **2**

Number of Peer-Reviewed Conference Proceeding publications (other than abstracts):

(d) Manuscripts

Received   Paper

        TOTAL:

Number of Manuscripts:

Books

<u>Received</u>   <u>Paper</u>

TOTAL:

Patents Submitted

Patents Awarded

Awards

Graduate Students

NAME	PERCENT_SUPPORTED	Discipline
Katelynn Bishop	0.38	
Kenly Brown	0.13	
Kristen Bryant	0.25	
Daisy Gonzales	0.13	
Ingrid Li Sato	0.53	
Lillian Jungleib	0.13	
Jerry Flores	0.47	
Katherine Matthews	0.13	
Megan Tabag	0.16	
Alicia Martinez	0.20	
Gregory Bennett	0.11	
Alicia Holdsworth	0.03	
Elvira Magomedova	0.05	
James Gertzog	0.03	
Amelia Tseng	0.03	
FTE Equivalent:	**2.76**	
Total Number:	**15**	

Names of Post Doctorates

NAME	PERCENT_SUPPORTED
Rebecca Damari	1.00
Aubrey Logan-Terry	1.00
FTE Equivalent:	**2.00**
Total Number:	**2**

Names of Faculty Supported

NAME	PERCENT_SUPPORTED	National Academy Member
Geoffrey Raymond	0.26	No
Nikki Jones	0.35	
Mardi Kidwell	0.29	
Deborah Tannen	0.03	
FTE Equivalent:	**0.93**	
Total Number:	**4**	

Names of Under Graduate students supported

NAME	PERCENT_SUPPORTED	Discipline
Kellie Averell	0.22	Communication
Breanne Peloquin	0.03	Communication
Ruth McBain	0.23	Communication
Rachael Campbell	0.03	Linguistics
Anthony Hamoui	0.03	Communication
Amy Dufrane	0.01	Communication
Gabriela Rubin	0.09	Linguistics
Katherine Seymour	0.07	Linguistics, Chinese
Allison Melendez	0.06	Linguistics, Chinese
FTE Equivalent:	**0.77**	
Total Number:	**9**	

Student Metrics
This section only applies to graduating undergraduates supported by this agreement in this reporting period

The number of undergraduates funded by this agreement who graduated during this period: 4.00

The number of undergraduates funded by this agreement who graduated during this period with a degree in science, mathematics, engineering, or technology fields:...... 4.00

The number of undergraduates funded by your agreement who graduated during this period and will continue to pursue a graduate or Ph.D. degree in science, mathematics, engineering, or technology fields:...... 0.00

Number of graduating undergraduates who achieved a 3.5 GPA to 4.0 (4.0 max scale):...... 3.00

Number of graduating undergraduates funded by a DoD funded Center of Excellence grant for Education, Research and Engineering:...... 0.00

The number of undergraduates funded by your agreement who graduated during this period and intend to work for the Department of Defense 1.00

The number of undergraduates funded by your agreement who graduated during this period and will receive scholarships or fellowships for further studies in science, mathematics, engineering or technology fields:...... 0.00

Names of Personnel receiving masters degrees

NAME
Alicia Holdsworth
Alicia Martinez
Gregory Bennett
Elvira Magomedova
Total Number: 4

Names of personnel receiving PHDs

NAME
Rebecca Damari
Aubrey Logan-Terry
Total Number: 2

Names of other research staff

NAME	PERCENT_SUPPORTED
Helen Klein	0.31
Gary Klein	0.28
Kristin Precoda	0.28
John Lowrance	0.17
Mark Gondek	0.08
John Deringer	0.36
Cory Albright	0.01
Jenny McNeill	0.03
Colleen Richey	0.13
Talia Shaham	0.01
Pamela Griffith	0.17
Jason Dinger	0.01
Brandon Moy	0.01
FTE Equivalent:	**1.85**
Total Number:	13

Sub Contractors (DD882)

1 a. MacroCognition LLC

1 b. P.O. Box 533

Yellow Springs   OH   45387

Sub Contractor Numbers (c): 19·000203
Patent Clause Number (d-1): 52.227-11
Patent Date (d-2): 12/1/07 12:00AM
Work Description (e): Develop descriptive accounts of stranger encounters
Sub Contract Award Date (f-1): 10/1/13 12:00AM
Sub Contract Est Completion Date(f-2): 3/31/13 12:00AM

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1 a. University of California - Santa Barbara

1 b. 3227 Cheadle Hall

3rd floor, MC 2050

Santa Barbara   CA   931062050

Sub Contractor Numbers (c): 19·000200
Patent Clause Number (d-1): 52227· 11
Patent Date (d-2): 12/1/07 12:00AM
Work Description (e): Support for IdentIfying Good Strangers
Sub Contract Award Date (f-1): 10/1/11 12:00AM
Sub Contract Est Completion Date(f-2): 11/16/13 12:00AM

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1 a. University of California - Santa Barbara

1 b. Office Of Research

Cheadle Hall, Room 3227

Santa Barbara   CA   931062050

Sub Contractor Numbers (c): 19·000200
Patent Clause Number (d-1): 52227· 11
Patent Date (d-2): 12/1/07 12:00AM
Work Description (e): Support for IdentIfying Good Strangers
Sub Contract Award Date (f-1): 10/1/11 12:00AM
Sub Contract Est Completion Date(f-2): 11/16/13 12:00AM

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1 a. Georgetown University

1 b. 37th and O Streets, NW

Washington   DC   200571789

Sub Contractor Numbers (c): 19·000201
Patent Clause Number (d-1): 52.227·11
Patent Date (d-2): 12/1/07 12:00AM
Work Description (e): Support for Identifying Goad Strangers
Sub Contract Award Date (f-1): 10/1/11 12:00AM
Sub Contract Est Completion Date(f-2): 9/30/13 12:00AM

                                                                        3520 Prospect Street NW, Suite 312

                                                                Washington   DC   200072631

Sub Contractor Numbers (c): 19·000201
Patent Clause Number (d-1): 52.227·11
Patent Date (d-2): 12/1/07 12:00AM
Work Description (e): Support for Identifying Goad Strangers
Sub Contract Award Date (f-1): 10/1/11 12:00AM
Sub Contract Est Completion Date(f-2): 9/30/13 12:00AM

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1 a. University of New Hampshire   1 b. 51 College Road

                                                                Durham   NH   03824

Sub Contractor Numbers (c): 19·000202
Patent Clause Number (d-1): 52.227 11
Patent Date (d-2): 12/1/07 12:00AM
Work Description (e): Support for Identifying Good Strangers
Sub Contract Award Date (f-1): 10/1/11 12:00AM
Sub Contract Est Completion Date(f-2): 11/16/13 12:00AM

Inventions (DD882)

Scientific Progress

See attachment.

Technology Transfer

Key Findings for Interpersonal Skills

SSIM TA1A Final Report
November 2013

Observe and Adapt to Variation in Communicative Norms
[Georgetown]

Knowledge

Communicative norms pertain to nonverbal communication (e.g. hand gestures, eye contact and eye gaze, and body positioning and movement), non-content features of language (e.g. turn-taking, volume, and prosody, or the melody and rhythm of language), and directness.

Communicative norms are not universal. They vary across contexts, but it is impossible to predict or learn the exact variations in norms across all contexts. Thus, observing and adapting to variations in communicative norms is an important universal skill for interpersonal success. Skilled communicators recognize that, even though this approach has its risks, it is nonetheless a crucial first step for orienting to an unfamiliar social terrain. What is discussed here is accumulated sets of norms and expectations built up due to an individual's life experiences and background. Approaching, orienting to, and transitioning into and out of various kinds of potentially hostile situations require recognizing that, while a nonverbal cue such as rigid body posture can often signal hostility, nonverbal cues can be ambiguous, depending on a person's interactional style. Observing and establishing a baseline for someone's interactional style is a good way to distinguish intentional signal from noise and to determine whether adapting to different communicative norms is appropriate or whether that person's nonverbal cues are indicating hostility.

Nonverbal communication includes hand gestures, eye contact and eye gaze, body positioning, and so on. Gestures can be used to aid or enhance comprehension, indicate the topic of conversation, signal an addressee, and convey meaning. Gestures can also add emphasis and function as part of situationally appropriate rituals such as greeting or departing rituals (4, 7, 10, 11, 14). Eye contact is crucial in determining engagement and who's being addressed (6, 11). Body positioning and movement can indicate degree of intimacy and relative affiliations of participants (11, 14). Observing and mirroring nonverbal communicative behaviors can be instrumental in the creation of rapport and interpersonal involvement, which contribute to successful interaction (16).

Non-content features of language include turn-taking, volume, and prosody, or the melody and rhythm of speech. Turn-taking is a particularly important non-content feature of language. Generally, across cultures and contexts, one person speaks at a time and there is minimal pause and minimal overlap (17). However, in some contexts, overlapping speech is a sign of interest and involvement in the conversation rather than of interruption or evidence of a conflict of conversational interests (20, 22). Backchannels are verbal and non-verbal signals that can indicate interest, sympathy, or agreement or disagreement (e.g. nodding or shaking one's head, saying "uh-huh", or "hmm"), etc. (18). Some people use backchannels to demonstrate that they're listening, while others expect these cues to signify agreement (3). Loudness and prosodic elements of interaction such as intonation can also vary across contexts and lead to miscommunication (8, 9).

Navigating variations in non-content features of language is a key element of successful interaction.

Directness refers to the explicitness with which an interlocutor makes clear their desires, thoughts, and agendas. Indirectness can have many benefits such as rapport building and plausible deniability (13, 5, 1, 21), but it is also a source of misunderstandings. All human beings have conflicting desires for both autonomy (negative face) and the desire to be recognized/accepted (positive face). The relative importance of negative and positive face vary across contexts, and a skilled interlocutor is able to navigate relative levels of directness in order to achieve successful interactions.

- Norms for hand gestures, eye contact and eye gaze, and body positioning and body movement vary among groups of people and individuals.

- The gestures, amount and type of eye contact, and body positioning and movement that you are most comfortable with could be unfamiliar, offensive, or convey a different meaning to others from a different background.

- The best way to learn the appropriate means of non-verbal communication is to observe what those around you are doing and adapt your behavior to be more similar to theirs. (See "Establish a baseline…" below).

- Norms for turn-taking, speech volume, and prosody vary among groups of people and individuals.

- The norms for these non-content features of language that you are most comfortable with could be unfamiliar, offensive, or convey a different meaning to others from a different background.

- The best way to learn the appropriate use of non-content features of language is to observe how those around you talk and adapt your speech to be more similar to theirs.

- All human beings have both the desire for autonomy (negative face) and the desire to be accepted (positive face). The relative importance of these desires varies across contexts, groups, and individuals.

- How directly or explicitly someone makes clear their desires, thoughts, and agendas is often tied to the relative valuing of positive and negative face.

- Indirectness has benefits including rapport building and plausible deniability, but it can also be a source of misunderstanding.

Skills

- Be able to recognize when someone uses a gesture, eye contact, or body positioning in a way that is different from you expect, for example if you feel they use too much or too little eye contact or gesturing, stand too close or too far, or use gestures you're unfamiliar with.

- Establish a baseline for the community you are observing, and for individuals you interact with, so that you can recognize when a non-verbal behavior associated with hostility (e.g. rigid body posture, exaggerated gesturing) is removed from the baseline and thus may signal a need to change from an observe and adapt strategy to a different frame that can deal with hostility.

- Be able to recognize when someone uses non-content features of language in a way that is different from what you expect, for example when you feel someone has interrupted you, is too talkative or too withdrawn, too loud or too quiet, or uses pitch contours that you find confusing.

- Establish a baseline for the community you are observing, and for individuals you interact with, so that you can recognize when a non-content feature of language associated with hostility (e.g. increased voice volume) is removed from the baseline and thus may signal a need to change from an observe and adapt strategy to a different frame that can deal with hostility.

- Be able to recognize when someone speaks more or less directly than you would expect. You may be tempted to label more direct speech as rude or domineering, and more indirect speech as passive aggressive, manipulative, or indecisive. Recognize that these labels may not be useful, and you may simply be dealing with a difference in norms.

Abilities/Attitudes

- Modify your physical behaviors to be similar to the ones you've observed, if appropriate. Mirror hand gestures, patterns of eye contact, and body positioning, unless you see evidence that mirroring is not appropriate. Examples of such evidence could be seemingly hostile behavior outside the baseline you've seen, or an unexpected response to behaviors you've mirrored. Try to mirror behaviors of individuals with similar social characteristics to you (e.g. age, gender, role in the community).

- Modify your non-content features of language to be similar to what you've heard. Imitate turn-taking patterns, matching of volume, and echoing of prosody, unless you come across evidence that imitating something is not appropriate. Try to imitate language features used by individuals with similar social characteristics to you (e.g. age, gender, role in the community).

- Modify your own communication to be more or less direct, depending on the apparent norms of the person you're speaking to. Try to imitate the directness level of individuals with similar social characteristics to you (e.g. age, gender, role in the community).

Allow Civilian Involvement
[UCSB]

Knowledge

This section covers five topics: (1) methods people use to pursue agendas and coordinate actions in interaction, (2) common ways that people can come to have conflicting agendas in an encounter, (3) a description of how people pursue competing agendas, (4) some examples illustrating these and how warfighters can recognize competing agendas as they emerge, and (5) ways in which such conflicts can be managed and the consequences of these approaches.

Methods for pursuing agendas and coordinating actions

Actions that expect a response from others are the main way that people accomplish things in interaction. Actions can be realized through talk or body behavior by a combination of both. Producing an action establishes a frame for understanding what the other party does next, whether they comply and produce the relevant action, do something else and so potentially resist, or convey some problem or indicate a problem in understanding. For example, a warfighter at a checkpoint may say "halt" or "stop" while extending an arm to an approaching civilian. This establishes what the civilian should do next and provides a frame for understanding what the civilian does (e.g., if the civilian continues driving, that has a very different meaning than it did before the warfighter shouted "stop"). If the civilian complies the warfighter might start the next action (e.g., checking IDs). If the civilian doesn't stop, the warfighter may choose among ways to pursue compliance (depending on the location, perceived threat, speed of the civilian's movement, their mode of travel, etc.) As this example shows, a large gulf separates occasions in which civilians respond to a warfighter's action and those where they don't. When civilians respond and comply, events proceed normally and nobody gives the encounter a second thought. When civilians don't respond, warfighters may escalate their pursuit of a response or even use force. They may also be angry or otherwise bothered by the lack of a response.

Although this is a simple example, such sequences of actions are the building blocks of social encounters and the main method that humans use to get things done in interaction with others. They are the most commonly used method that humans have for conveying their understanding of the encounter. Although civilians may have fewer and later opportunities for actions that expect responses than warfighters do, they will use them to show their understanding, complaints, concerns, and so on, and will expect a response. In our data, when police officers ignored civilian actions, they were considerably more likely to use force in the encounter. By contrast, when they responded to or simply acknowledged civilians' initiating actions, civilians were much more likely to cooperate and officers were much more likely to achieve their goals cooperatively.

In most cases, warfighters and officers do respond to civilian actions. When they don't, there is usually a dispute or other issue that makes a response problematic. Thus,

warfighters need to know how to manage conflicts that could make responding problematic. The next section covers some problems that can arise and some ways that warfighters can manage them.

How conflicting agendas arise

Conflicting agendas are very frequent. In any encounter, participants may have different ideas about what's important, what should happen, and so on. Even when people largely agree about what should happen, they may disagree about the order in which things should happen. Warfighters, police officers, and civilians must work out on the fly what will be done in the encounter and in what order. It is not uncommon for participants to find themselves in conflict regarding which party's agenda takes priority. Moreover, in warfighter encounters which may have a latent or incipient oppositional character, conflicts may be especially problematic for two reasons:

1. Conflicts over what happens next can be viewed in terms that extend beyond the encounter itself. For example, each party's agenda may be viewed as reflecting the their interests in ways associated with their institutional or other categorical identities (e.g., as warfighters, police officers, members of a racial, ethnic or religious group, etc.) When this happens, each participant may view the other's agenda as reflecting a negative view of the other's identity (e.g., "you're doing this because you're an X", or if "I weren't an X you wouldn't be doing this to me"). In addition, when warfighters adopt a zero-sum approach, they may view a civilian's success in pursuing their agenda as a loss for themselves. When either of these conditions holds, resolving whose actions will take priority and achieving cooperation on other matters can be challenging. How warfighters resolve such issues can have consequences for the encounter's mission and other long-term operational aims such as establishing trust.
2. The ways participants pursue different agendas are competitive. They show a participant's commitment to pursuing some action right now (and hence reflect its importance to them), often without regard to what the other party may want to do. In some cases, competing parties may seek to resolve who goes first before either knows what the other is trying to do. This does not always generate conflict: If one person uses such a method and the other gives in, whose agenda takes priority is quickly resolved, even without each party knowing what the other is trying to do. However, if both parties use these methods, conflicts can rapidly escalate, especially when each party persists in pursuing their agenda after they see that the other has done the same.

Our research shows that how warfighters manage and resolve such conflicts affects civilians' willingness to cooperate and how the encounter's goal is accomplished. Because the long-term relations between warfighters and civilians are primarily composed of such encounters and what others see or hear about them, how warfighters manage what happens is critical for establishing positive, cooperative relations over the long run.

How conflicting agendas escalate

Civilians pursue agendas that compete with those pursued by warfighters for a broad

range of reasons. While some civilians may be determined to pursue conflicts with warfighters merely because they are warfighters, conflicts typically emerge as a byproduct of what the parties are otherwise doing.

In most circumstances when warfighters encounter civilians, these encounters will be initiated to pursue some task or mission. Warfighters may engage civilians in the course of searches, as part of an effort to develop rapport with locals, as part of key leader engagements, and so on. Civilians may engage warfighters to register complaints, to gain information, or to sell goods or services. No matter which party initiates the engagement, the other will very likely already be doing something and so have a different agenda. For example, police officers typically stop civilians who are involved in some other activity (driving to the store, walking home from a bar, arguing with a family member, etc.) The initiation of the encounter will thus disrupt what the civilian is already doing. While this may seem obvious, it is not trivial. In our data, we noted that officers initiating encounters or giving orders frequently encountered resistance because the civilian were actively involved in some other activity, not because they willfully rejected the officers' requests or commands. The fact that civilians and officers had different agendas simply reflected the circumstances in which the encounter was initiated.

When warfighters initiate encounters, they first have to establish a joint focus of attention with the civilian. This may require getting the civilian to suspend their involvement in whatever they were doing. Even when warfighters and civilians have already established a joint focus of attention and had some form of sustained engagement with one another, the parties can still find themselves with competing agendas. If warfighters attempt to secure and search the civilian, the civilian may have questions or complaints about the encounter, the warfighter, or something else. As these examples illustrate, parties to an encounter may have competing agendas for a variety of reasons, some external to an encounter and some generated by it. These alternative agendas can encompass what the entire encounter is about (i.e., what are we here to do?) or disputes regarding what should happen next (i.e., will the warfighter search an area or civilian first, or first answer questions about why searching is necessary?)

Such competing agendas can be a source of quickly escalating conflict. As each party attempts to pursue their own agenda, the other's pursuit of some alternative will typically be seen as a form of resistance to the first person's agenda, and thus as an indicator of active or latent hostility. There are two primary reasons for this: (1) the methods people use to convey their commitment to pursuing an action typically include forms of conduct associated with aggression; and (2) the interactional dynamic to which these contribute can lead to rapid escalations in conflict. These are expanded on below.

1. When two parties each attempt to pursue a different course of action, they typically use conduct that conveys their commitment to that agenda and their view that the agenda is important and that it has to get done *now*. The methods they use are universally associated with aggression: increased volume (in speech), changes in pace (either faster or slower) of speech or embodied conduct, interruptions, and so on. Various forms of body behavior and body positioning may also be deployed: for

example, parties typically lean in closer to the other, use gestures with increased amplitude as well as force and speed, and in some cases, parties may adopt pre-fight or pre-flight postures. These forms of body behavior can convey aggression, or, in extreme cases, project imminent possible violence.

2. Parties do not deploy these methods randomly or individually; rather, they are typically used in ways that are sensitive to what the other party is doing. There are two key aspects to the sequencing of these methods that bear some explanation:

   (a) Since the methods people select to compete are sensitive to what the other party is doing, the selection of such methods simultaneously conveys a commitment to one's agenda and a rejection of the other's. For example, speeding up talk or other conduct may be used when one party anticipates interruption, to try to complete something before the other begins. Similarly, someone who has been interrupted may hold their body posture and gesture while their counterpart attempts to pursue an alternative agenda. In this way they convey that they are waiting for the next opportunity to resume what is held in abeyance. Such methods may convey that one is not paying attention to the substance of what the other is doing, only to the fact that they are trying to do something. For each method one party uses to convey their commitment to their own agenda, they simultaneous convey resistance to the other's agenda.

   (b) The selection of such methods is made in real time. As each party competes with what the other party has just done, the other party can then adapt by adding or switching to a new method. Thus, following the example above in which a party increased the pace of her conduct in anticipation of interruption, once the other party interrupts, the first party may slow down, and/or increase volume, as a method for outlasting and competing with the other's interruption. This can engender a further escalation by the other party designed to outshout or outlast what the first party is doing. As each move by one party prompts an upgrade in the method used by the other, the pursuit of competing agendas can escalate into full-blown conflict in just a handful of moves.

Because of this interactional dynamic, parties can become embroiled in such a conflict in very short order, quite independently of their plans or desires to do so or of the content of what is being disputed. Even friends can move from talking to screaming in just a few seconds if neither party gives way. In encounters with one or more armed participants, the results can be even more dramatic. But even when open conflict doesn't emerge, how a competition is resolved can have lasting consequences.

In a basic sense, these are conflicts over the sequencing of action: When both tasks or activities cannot be pursued simultaneously (which is typically though not always the case), the parties will have to establish which task or activity will be given priority and pursued and which task will be given a lower priority and so be put off and thus possibly abandoned. While it might seem obvious that the warfighter's priorities will prevail if

they are the only party with a weapon, how this local conflict is managed can have both near-term and long-term consequences for a civilian's willingness to cooperate.

An example of managing conflicting agendas

The first example below illustrates how a civilian and a police officer can each initiate a different course of action, treat pursuing it as a priority, and thereby come into conflict. The excerpt is taken from an encounter in which police officers have been called to a convenience store to deal with a dispute. When the officers arrived on the scene they were met by one of the complainants (an African American male, CM1) who directs their attention to a white couple (CF1 and CM3) inside the store who CM1 claims are the source of trouble.[1] As soon as the officers enter the store, one of the civilians inside (a young African American male, CM2) preemptively begins (at line 1) by saying "hey honestly sir. I have no issues." Evidently, the civilian's action is designed to rule out a possible understanding of his role in the conflict the officers have come to break up. This claim invites some response from the officers such as "okay", or "that's not what we heard", etc. However, the officer instead produces an alternative action – a directive ("let's move outside", line 3). Tather than responding to or acknowledging the civilian's utterance, the officer treats getting the civilians outside as a priority. At this stage there are two competing actions: one initiated by a civilian, one by the officers. If the civilian simply responded to the officer's action, the incipient competition would be resolved. In this case, however, the civilian persists in pursuing a response to his utterance (in lines 5 and 7), thus conveying his commitment to that action. Others on the scene (CF1, line 6) join him, which may prompt his competitive escalation (e.g., as suggested by the restarts in line 7). In turn, the officer continues to treat getting the civilians outside as the first order of business by reiterating his directive, emphasizing its priority ("First of all"), and establishing that it applies to CF1 as well as the others (see line 12). At this point, there is an incipient standoff: each party (CM2 and IM1) has initiated a distinct course of action, and then pursued it after the other party has shown a commitment to their own agenda.

Before considering what happens next it is worth considering the reasons why each party treats the course of action they have initiated as a priority. The civilian (CM2) is attempting to establish that he is not involved in the dispute (he was "keeping the peace"), apparently so he can resume whatever he was doing before that (e.g., shopping) and enabling him to avoid further contact with the police. Apparently for CM2, going outside means being treated as one of the participants in the fight and the subsequent outcomes that can entail (e.g., questioning, possible arrest, etc.) Thus he is attempting to establish that he is not involved in the dispute instead of, or at least before, going outside. By contrast, as a matter of safety, the officers treat separating participants and moving them to a place where they can be more easily controlled as a priority and as a task that must be completed before any further discussion. From the officer's perspective, an attempt to

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[1] The race of the participants is relevant to the dispute that prompted the call to the police in the first place and to the conflict that emerged when they arrived. The complainant who meets the officers in the parking lot claims that a white couple used racial epithets and threats in a conflict with him. Despite this, when the officers enter to separate the disputants they focus on a young African American male who adopts a defensive posture.

discuss who did what can re-open a dispute and lead to escalation. The officers can neither let CM2 walk away nor establish his lack of involvement before moving outside. Thus, each party is committed to having their own course of action prevail precisely because participating in the other's course of action opens possible future paths that they want to avoid. Given these conditions, it should not be surprising that both parties persist in pursuing their own agenda. They do so not because they are unaware of what the other party is trying to do; rather it is precisely because they *are* aware of the other's agenda that they treat their own course of action as so important.

Example 1 [2]

IM1, IM2: two police officers. CF1, CM2, CM3: civilians

```
1    CM2    hey honestly sir. I have no
2           issues
3    IM1    Let's go outside
4               ((unintelligible))
5    CM2    this guy- honestly- honestly-
6    CF1             he's cool. he's,
7    CM2    I'm the- I'm the one that's keeping the peace sir.
8    IM2                 those dudes out there,
9    CF1                                         he's he's
10          the one ((unintelligible)).
11   CM3    i'm fine.
12   IM1    First of all you're coming outside too
13          okay?
14   CM2    okay. No ((unintelligible)). fine sir
15   CF1          hey he's cool though. please
16          believe me man. he's,
17   CM2    But listen- listen sir i'm not
18          Okay- okay >I'm comin' outside
19   IM2          OUTside right now.
20          right now.
21   CM2    I'm coming outside sir.
22   IM2    RIGH[T now.
23   CM2          honestly
24   CM2    I didn't even ((unintelligible))
25          Would you tell him?
26          I didn't do any fucking thing man
27   CF1    No he didn't- he didn't do anything.
28   IM2          okay all right. all right.
29          just let me find out. Let
30          me find out all right
```

although one of the civilians verbally acknowledges the officer's directive (in line 14), he and others also persist in pursuing the officers' acceptance of his claims (in lines 15-17). With neither side willing to back down, the standoff escalates with each party adopting more competitive or coercive methods for following their own course of action. In line 17, CM2's assertive, "Listen" and its repetition initiates a competitive attempt to get IM2 to listen to him rather than vice versa. In the midst of CM2's effort, IM2 upgrades the officer's effort to get the parties outside: Rather than waiting for CM2 to complete his utterances, he begins his turn in the middle of the civilian's utterance (in line 18); instead

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[2] Video: SPD7455@20090331021633

of a directive, he now composes the utterance as a command demanding immediate compliance ("Outside, right now") and delivers it at increased volume. IM2 also escalates his pursuit in another way: as he issues the command, he grabs CM2's arm and begins to forcibly remove him from the store. Although the civilians comply with this command, CM2 now upgrades his effort to assert his innocence, first by enlisting others in the dispute (see line 25), and more explicitly registering his frustration and anger (line 26).

One might think that once the officers succeeded in moving everyone outside, the conflict that emerged between them and CM2 would subside. As is often the case, however, once a conflict has escalated to a point where it includes physical contact, swearing and other overt forms of aggression, the parties' preoccupation with it and the emotions it gives rise to makes it nearly impossible to pursue any other activity. In this case four or five officers spend the next twenty minutes trying to calm the civilian down. Although the officers succeed in getting the civilians outside, the methods they use to accomplish that outcome significantly complicate their ability to accomplish almost anything else. The encounter ends with CM2 taking each officer's name to file a complaint the next day.

Several features of this encounter are worth noting because they are common in other cases. First, we can see that each party's commitment to pursuing their own course of action and not complying with the other's was neither arbitrary nor capricious; this is by far the most common basis for the emergence of disputes. Second, this excerpt illustrates how quickly parties can move from competing courses of action to full conflict. This encounter moves from opening exchanges to the use of force in less than ten seconds. Within just a few exchanges the main protagonists (CM2 and IM2) find themselves yelling and physically struggling with each other. Finally, the aftermath of this episode illustrates the dramatic asymmetry between how quickly the competing actions can escalate into a full-blown conflict and how long it can take to restore calm to a scene once such a conflict has developed. Although the officers successfully implement their agenda, they spend the next twenty minutes trying to calm the civilian down.

When warfighters and civilians each produce initiating actions, they have to work out which course of action will prevail. While this might seem to be relatively trivial, it isn't. Participants may be very committed to their own course of action for a many reasons. But each party also knows that if the other succeeds, there is no guarantee that there will be an opportunity to pursue their own agenda. This risk is different for warfighters and civilians: Since warfighters usually initiate most of the actions in an encounter, it is much easier for them to revive a suspended course of action. However, when warfighters or officers succeed in pursuing their course of action (as in Example 1), civilians know that they may never have the chance to pursue their own, competing agenda.

Ways to manage competing agendas

There are several ways warfighters can resolve whose course of action will prevail. Warfighters can use force or the threat of force to make their course of action take priority. This comes at a cost, however, and will generate conflict, damage trust and undermine cooperation. In our data, when officers ignored the questions or other actions

that civilians posed they were much more likely to use force. By contrast, where officers responded to or simply acknowledged civilian actions, civilians were much more likely to cooperate and officers were much more likely to complete their projects cooperatively. All of this suggests that, for warfighters, unilaterally asserting authority generates more problems than it solves. There are some fairly simple alternatives that enable warfighters to prioritize their own actions without generating this sort of resistance and conflict.

Below are two possible ways of addressing conflicts of the sort seen in Example 1. Both solutions entail transforming what appears to be a zero-sum game (where the success of one party means a loss for the other) into a problem of sequencing. That is, rather than establishing which course of action will be pursued and which will be abandoned, warfighters can use various ways to order competing courses of action.

One way to resolve sequential conflicts is to establish an agenda on the fly. This practice has three steps: (1) acknowledging that the civilian is attempting to initiate or pursue a course of action, (2) establishing that the warfighter's course of action will be pursued first, and (3) projecting a return to the matter raised by the civilian when it is practicable to do so. While the importance of the second step may be obvious, each step is critical. If the warfighter does not begin by acknowledging the civilian's course of action, the civilian will continue to pursue it and thereby continue the struggle over who goes first. If the warfighter fails to offer a later opportunity to resume the civilian's course of action, the civilian may be unwilling to freely cooperate and treat the warfighter's course of action as the priority. These steps can be conveyed via gesture and other body behavior: e.g., by nodding to acknowledge a civilian's actions and using references to self- and other to establish the sequential order in which the actions will be pursued (e.g., point to self and indicate 1, point to other and indicate 2).

If this approach is used early, in a warfighter's initial response to an incipient conflict, it is even more effective. In the following example, a police officer finds that a civilian pulled over for a traffic violation has a warrant for her arrest. As he returns to her, the civilian apparently anticipates having the officer issue a citation. Instead, the officer asks her to step out of the car. Complicating matters, the officer finds that the civilian is on the phone. After securing the driver's full attention (lines 5-8), and after his partner gets the passengers out of the car as well (lines 9-10), a possible conflict begins to emerge. As the officer attempts to secure the driver by getting her to step out of the car and submit to a search, the driver begins to ask questions (by asking what is happening, line 16, expressing doubt that she has a warrant, lines 26 and 28, asking what the warrant is for, line 32). Although the officer responds to the first of these (by providing a brief answer), he understands that responding to the later actions risks engendering a dispute or other form of conflict that could complicate his efforts to secure the driver. As in the last case the officer responds to these queries by projecting that they will be addressed at a later point. And as in the last case, the officer succeeds in avoiding a full blown conflict.

Example 2 [3]

```
1   IM1       hello ma'am. i need you to step
```

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[3] Video: SPD_6907@20070109131616

```
2              out of the vehicle please.
3  CF1         why?
4              (pause)
5  IM1         you need to put the phone down.
6              face me.
7  CF1         {on phone} okay. let me call you
8              back.
9  IM2         can you guys step out of the
10             vehicle for me for a few
11             minutes?
12 IM1         you need to step out of the
13             vehicle please.
14 IM2         please.
15             (pause)
16 CF1         what's the problem?
17             (pause)
18 IM1         ma'am just- all right. go ahead
19             and just.
20             (pause)
21 CF1         thank you.
22             (pause)
23 IM1         ma'am there's a warrant for your
24             arrest.
25             (pause)
26 CF1         there's a warrant for my arrest?
27 IM1         yes there is.
28 CF1         are you sure?
29             (pause)
30 IM1         yes i am.
31             (pause)
32 CF1         what's the warrant for?
33             (pause)
34 IM1         step back here please.
35             (pause)
36 IM1         if- if i am mistaken we'll figure   officer projects that
37             it out. okay? right now you're      he will take up the
38             being audio recorded. okay?         matter shortly
39 CF1         okay.
40             (pause)
41 IM2         {unintelligible, talking to other officer}
42             (pause)
43 IM1         um,
44 CF1         yeah. she got a license.
45 IM1         w- we'll if you just have them sit
46             out there for a minute and we'll-
47             we'll uh take a look and then
48             we'll give it to them.
49 CF1         can you tell me what my warrant's
50             for sir?
51             (pause)
52 IM1         just gonna t- check you and your
53             pockets real quick and i'll put
54             you in the car and then we'll talk
55             some more. okay?
56 CF1         yeah go ahead.                        civilian accepts
```

In line 16 the driver asks a question that might launch a course of action (discussing the reason for the stop) that could compete with or complicate the course of action initiated by the officer – i.e. getting the driver and her passengers out of the car. The officer's directives may have prompted the driver's query insofar as the request to exit the car suggests something other than the routine traffic stop they apparently believed was under way. Nevertheless, the officer responds by answering her query. This answer prompts a follow-up query (line 32) the answer to which may require what the officer would consider a premature discussion of the specifics of the case (premature because the driver is not yet out of the car, searched and secured). In line 36, the officer acknowledges the driver's query and indicates they will discuss it as soon as the current course of action (which is searching her and placing her in the back of his car) has been completed. A similar pattern is evident in lines 49 and 52, and in this case the driver explicitly accepts what the officer has proposed (in line 56). (The driver's "okay" in line 39 appears to be a response to the officer's telling her about the recording.)

This case illustrates several additional findings from our research: 1) the earlier warfighters establish a sequence for competitive actions, the more effective this will be in resolving or avoiding conflicts. 2) When civilians initiate courses of action that do not directly compete with what the warfighter is trying to accomplish, or where those actions can be addressed and dispensed with fairly quickly, warfighters can use less elaborate methods for managing civilian involvement. For example, the officer responded to the civilian's query in line 16 by informing her that there was a warrant for her arrest. As these cases illustrate, the civilians' actions reflect their concerns, worries, or complaints about what is happening or about what they are being asked to do. Addressing these questions and concerns, as early as possible, promotes cooperation. This appears to be true even in cases where civilians don't actually accept or agree with the answer a warfighter or police officer provides (as in Example 2).

To summarize, our research included all cases in which civilians brought up questions, complaints, requests, and so on, not only those in which civilians and officers pursued competing actions. The quantitative analysis (discussed in "Quantitative Analyses of the Effect of Allowing Civilian Involvement") looked at all of these and whether officers acknowledged or responded to them, or ignored or suppressed them (by talking over them, threatening the civilian and so on). The results were stunning: when officers responded to a civilian, the civilians were more likely to cooperate with officer requests and commands, and were more likely to cooperate with officers in completing the mission or task of the encounter. When officers ignored or suppressed (two or more) civilian issues, the civilian was less cooperative, and officers were four times more likely to use force in completing the encounter's agenda.

This pattern very likely reflects some fairly basic aspects of human sociality. Humans expect that actions they produce will be acknowledged in some way, either by a recipient responding or offering some account for not responding. Research over the last three decades suggests that this expectation has a normative dimension, meaning that people treat responding as the right thing to do and view failures to respond in moral terms. Moreover, awareness of this normative expectation is evident in very young children under two years of age, and appear to hold across asymmetries in power and status. Thus,

when warfighters ignore or suppress civilian actions, they violate one of the more basic normative expectations humans use to manage social relations.

Beyond this very basic concern, there are specific practicalities associated with encounters initiated by warfighters and police that make responding to civilians especially significant. We find that civilians are more likely to bring up questions, complaints, or requests when they believe there is some problem in the encounter. Whatever the officers think about these actions (e.g., that they were naive, foolish, misguided, or disingenuous), they reflect central concerns of civilians who posed them. By pursuing responses from warfighters and police, civilians show that they are committed to these actions and that the underlying concerns they express are important to them. While officers and warfighters may suppress or ignore a civilian's expression of such concerns in the short run, unless they directly address those concerns, warfighters are unlikely to convince civilians to drop them altogether. When warfighters and officers do not respond to such questions, they are not only violating a basic normative expectation held by humans generally, they are missing an opportunity to resolve a matter of evident concern for the civilians. Each civilian action provides another opportunity for warfighters to address possible trouble before it becomes serious.

Skills

Based on the above analysis several key skills can be identified for managing circumstances in which parties to an encounter each tries to pursue their own agenda at the expense of the other's agenda.

> - *Identify incipient conflicts:* Incipient conflicts can be observed where civilians either fail to respond to warfighter commands or directives or produce a competing action instead. Body behavior to look for are:
> --Gestures or postures that civilians hold while the warfighter produces an action
> --Gestures or postures that are repeatedly adopted (often instead of producing the response suited to the warfighter's conduct)
> --Gestures or other body behavior that civilians slow down or speed up; even when parties do not share a language, they may also increase volume and slow their speech down.
> In addition, warfighters can watch for occasions in which they find themselves producing any of these behaviors.

- *Respond to civilians and manage conflicts:* When warfighters find themselves in an incipient or actual conflict with civilians regarding what should happen next, there are several methods they can use to resolve the conflict. These include:
  --Acknowledging that the civilian is trying to accomplish something
  --Provide a rationale for complying with the warfighter's commands first, and
  --Establish an order for the competing actions, e.g., by projecting that the warfighter will address the civilian's concerns once the first action has been completed
  Many of these actions can be conveyed via gestures and other body behavior: e.g., by nodding to acknowledge a civilian's actions, and using references to self and other to establish the order in which the actions will be pursued.

- *Recognize and pay attention to what matters civilians care about:* By tracking what civilians are doing or trying to do, the warfighter can learn about them, including what they care about or are worried about. The actions that civilians produce thus do not have to be impediments to accomplishing the warfighter's mission; instead, they provide material for understanding civilians, and occasions for addressing their concerns, that can directly facilitate achieving goals and missions and establishing positive or at least neutral long-term relations with locals.

Abilities/Attitudes

- *Avoid taking negative conduct personally or negatively evaluating civilians.* Civilians may have many reasons for complaining to warfighters which will only rarely pertain to the specific person they encounter. Nevertheless, warfighters and police officers sometimes regard civilian objections, noncompliance, or other forms of resistance as personal attacks. This is never productive. It is likely to generate frustration and anger, and may prompt reciprocal efforts to personalize the encounter by the warfighter or police officer. Even in cases where the attacks *are* personal – even when they are prompted by events with the encounter itself – taking things personally rarely produces positive results. By the same token, warfighters should avoid developing negative views regarding their civilian counterparts. Being wary and remaining safe need not be related to negative evaluations of or expectations about civilians.

- *Remain flexible and open in pursuing outcomes*. In some cases it may seem that ignoring or rejecting civilian concerns or objections provides the straightest path to the completion of the mission. This rarely works, and over the long term will almost always generate additional resistance. By contrast, remaining somewhat open or flexible in pursuing the completion of a task can be more effective in both the short and long run. The officers in **Error! Reference source not found.** and Example 2 above illustrated this attitude; each sought a novel method for moving past what was or could have been a standoff. Instead of plowing ahead with their own objective, they found an alternative pathway out of the conflict that allowed the civilians to cooperate with them.

- *Convey an interest in responding to civilian concerns, and actually respond where possible.* Even where warfighters may take a dim view of the concerns or matters that civilians raise, it is better to adopt and convey an open or neutral orientation to them. We recommend avoiding any attempts to convey one's own evaluation of what should be important for civilians. If one is compelled to offer civilians advice about what they should really care about, this can most effectively be accomplished after addressing what the civilians have conveyed that they care about.

- *Learn what civilians care about and adapt actions to their concerns and beliefs.* Treat actions initiated by civilians as opportunities for learning about and addressing their concerns, rather than as impediments to mission completion. The likelihood that civilians will cooperate with warfighters can be enhanced by understanding their concerns (as conveyed by their actions, body behavior and other conduct), and adapting actions to their understanding of their circumstances.

Developing a Common Understanding of an Encounter
[UCSB]

Knowledge

In encounters with others, people search for meaning. In any encounter civilians will attribute some meaning to a warfighter's conduct, and the only questions are how they will understand it and how the warfighter will influence that understanding. Moreover, in potentially high-stakes encounters, participants with less power, knowledge, or authority – i.e., civilians – typically adopt negative assumptions about warfighters and the encounter unless given some positive or at least neutral frame for making sense of what's going on. If warfighters do not provide a plausible way to understand what they are doing, civilians will assume the worst and act accordingly. By contrast, if warfighters provide a way of understanding an encounter and what they are doing, they are likely to find that civilians are more cooperative. Promoting the adoption of a relatively benign interpretive frame for an encounter may be especially important in circumstances where the warfighters' conduct would otherwise appear threatening or problematic.

Warfighters can frame encounters or activities in a variety of ways: using signage (e.g., at established checkpoints), printed materials that can be shown to civilians, verbal explanations (even if short), or gestures and other body movements. This section first discusses explanations because these are among the most familiar and common ways to establish a common understanding with civilians. After making some distinctions between types of explanations or ways of framing encounters or actions, and the types of coordination and cooperation enabled, we will consider some minimally verbal and non-verbal methods that can be used when the parties do not share a common language.

The fact that socially skilled warfighters routinely produce explanations in their encounters with civilians suggests that they understand that civilians whom they contact may have little or no understanding of what is happening, what they should do, or why they should do it. When warfighters initiate encounters with civilians, the best communicators typically give a reason for the encounter. They may also provide a reason for asking a question, giving a directive and so on. For example, most police are wary of where civilians place their hands. Many also know that civilians may be completely unaware of this concern, and therefore tell civilians to keep their hands out of their pockets. If an officer says "keep your hands out of your pockets!", they provide the civilian with an opportunity to comply but do not communicate why doing so is important, and may convey suspicion or distrust. By contrast, if an officer says "Keep your hands out of your pockets. For your safety and mine I need to know where your hands are," the civilian now has a reason for cooperating, as well as a reason for *keeping* his/her hands visible. The civilian can also understand that the command is associated with safety concerns that apply across situations, and not with suspicion. Prior research in social psychology has established that people are significantly more likely to comply with requests or commands that are accompanied by even a brief explanation. Our research also suggests that type of explanation matters: explanations that frame events in terms of giving or receiving help appear to be especially effective in promoting cooperation.

Three useful dimensions of developing a shared understanding, or frame, are:

- **What is being framed?** Warfighters can offer explanations for encounters (e.g., I stopped you because...), activities (e.g., searching a person, using questions to gather information, taking a person into custody), or discrete actions (e.g., asking a question, reaching into a pocket).

- **What prompted the warfighter to frame an encounter, activity or action?** A warfighter can provide an explanation on her/his own, or can produce one after the civilian asks for or demands one. This turns out to be important because civilians appear to be more likely to challenge or reject explanations when they have to ask for them; civilians appear more likely to accept explanations that warfighters offer unprompted, especially when the explanations are given early, e.g., when an encounter begins, or before an action or activity. Plausible, early explanations tend to "crowd out" other, possibly more skeptical understandings, making it much less likely that these will ever occur to civilians. Once a civilian begins to entertain negative or skeptical ways of understanding events or actions, they may find it hard to completely abandon these, even after warfighters provide reasonable alternative explanations.

- **What sort of frames can warfighters provide?** There are many ways to frame encounters, activities or actions. Two basic categories are (1) framing encounters or actions in terms of asking for or offering help, and (2) all other types of frames.

In proposing a frame for an event, warfighters should take into account how civilians are likely to understand or view the encounter or the warfighters. A frame that ignores or contradicts their understanding of what is happening will lead to conflict and disagreement rather than cooperation. On the other hand, taking into account what civilians know or believe can be an effective method of securing their cooperation.

Framing events in ways that civilians view or soon recognize as less than honest can generate significant hostility and mistrust. Nevertheless, there is often more flexibility in how encounters can be framed than most people expect. Where tasks or activities are distasteful to civilians, warfighters can promote cooperation by asking for their help in getting through the tasks or by establishing other bases of alignment. For example, in neighborhoods where community members distrusted the police, officers enforcing a gang injunction sometimes claimed that their "bosses" made them initiate encounters. This essentially established a degree of alignment between the officers and the civilians they stopped, and diminished the degree to which the civilians viewed the officers' conduct as evidence of harassment, racism, and so on. Similarly, officers enforcing rules prohibiting homeless persons from sitting or lying on streets during the day were often successful at gaining cooperation when they said that a citizen had called them. As with the gang injunction, this established that the officer was more or less compelled to act, and turned the civilian's cooperation into a form of assistance to the officer.

Explanations that pertain to the encounter as a whole typically occur in or near the opening phase of the encounter. For example in the following, an officer initiates the encounter by telling the civilian that she is being recorded and why he stopped her.

Example 3 [4]

```
1  IM1      yes ma'am. first off. let you know
2           you are being recorded by an audio
3           video device. here's why I stopped
4           you. thirty three in a twenty mile
5           an hour school zone.
```

In the following traffic stop, an officer explains who he is and how he came to be there.

Example 4 [5]

```
1  IM1      hi sir.
2  IM1      hi. I'm officer %name. our voice
3           is being recorded. okay? okay. I'm
4           a DOI officer. this officer
5           asked me to stop by here and
6           talk to you. okay?
7  CM1      okay.
```

Here the officer's explanation consists of three parts: how he categorizes himself ("I'm a DOI officer"), who asked him to be there ("this officer asked me to stop by..."), and what he will do ("and talk to you."). The officer adds "okay?", thereby inviting the civilian to accept his explanation. While this might seem trivial, this practice can be effective in establishing a cooperative relationship with a civilian (or enable the warfighter to anticipate trouble if the civilian rejects or challenges the explanation).

In other cases the officer may announce what they are doing and indicate that a third party's conduct has prompted the encounter (e.g., because they have called in to report an illegal activity or register a complaint). For example, the officer below explains her presence by describing a call she received which reported illegal or unsafe activities, i.e., "panhandling...on the median".

Example 5 [6]

```
1  IF1      hey there.
2  IF1      i got a call about you panhandling
3           over there on the median.
```

The next example concerns a potentially more serious matter: callers have reported seeing a man holding a pair of scissors, bleeding from his nose. When the officer approaches, he appears disheveled and is only intermittently responsive, which may suggest mental health problems. The officer begins by attempting to secure the scene, by

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[4] Video: SPD_4649@20070105091442
[5] Video: SPD_5162@20070120003920
[6] Video: SFPD_PanhandlingonMedia_NO_05282012

asking him to empty his hands and turn away from her, and then explains at the first possible opportunity why she initiated the encounter (see lines 7-8).

Example 6 [7]
```
1   IF1:  Could you drop dow- drop the stuff out of your hands for
2         me. Okay?
3   CM1:  Okay.
4   IF1:  Okay turn around for me plea[se.
5   CM1:                              [Sure
6   IF1:  Put your hands behind your back
7   IF1:  Okay I need to find out what's going on. We got a lotta
8         calls about you today
```

In response the civilian cooperates with the officer's requests (some of which are framed as requests for help, as in lines 1-2).

In these cases, the officers begin encounters by giving explanations for their presence on the scene without prompting by the civilians. In other cases civilians may ask for an explanation, suggesting that one hasn't been given or that what was provided wasn't understood or accepted; or they solicit an explanation in other ways, e.g., by complaining about the officer or making accusations. Below a civilian being handcuffed, who apparently believed she was merely being searched, asks, "what am I doing?" in the opening moments. The officer responds by explaining the encounter's goal ("...going to jail") and the reason ("for driving with a suspended license").

Example 7 [8]
```
1   CF1     what am i doing?
2   IM1     you're going to jail for
3           driving with license
4           suspended.
5   CF1     oh.
```

Although the officer only provides an explanation for the encounter after the civilian solicits one, he does so in response to her first attempt to understand what is happening.

By contrast, in the following a civilian being searched and handcuffed asks why he is being detained. This excerpt takes place considerably after the beginning of the encounter (about two minutes into it).

Example 8 [9]
```
47  CM1     so uh w- why am i being
48          detained again?
49          (pause)
50  IM1     because you're a little bit
51          drunk and uncooperative. and
52          you're and you're uh,
```

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[7] Video: SFPD_ManwithScissorsPt1ofFullEpisode_NO_05282012
[8] Video: SPD 5452@20090709010643weknowyouvegotthatgun
[9] Video: SPD 7479@20100509035329

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53   CM1      n- n- no. you detained me
54            before that.
55            (pause)
56   IM1      and you're obstructing traffic
57            flow okay? jaywalking that that
58            gives me a (unintelligible).
59   CM1      jaywalking all right. sure.
```

The civilian designs his turn as a follow up question; his use of "again" in line 48 points to a prior effort to solicit an explanation from the officer. In most cases, asking for an explanation, or especially for a second or later explanation, foreshadows trouble: civilians typically ask for explanations when they believe that officers or warfighters cannot provide an adequate one or when what has been provided is inadequate in some way. In this respect, the civilian's question in lines 47-48 conveys something like a challenge: if the officer had a good reason for the stop, he would have provided it already. It may not be surprising, then, that the civilian immediately rejects the officer's response in lines 50-52. And though the civilian (grudgingly) accepts the officer's next explanation in lines 56-58, that he was stopped for jaywalking, the way he does so conveys a degree of skepticism regarding its adequacy. By repeating the officer's claim in line 59 and adding "Alright. Sure" the civilian formally accepts that the officer stopped him for jaywalking, while also tacitly conveying his incredulity that the officer has now decided to place him in custody. The encounter only goes downhill from here: within a minute the officer has tackled the civilian to the ground and placed him under arrest.

If we look at the way the officer initiated the encounter in Example 6, we can see that the problems evident in Example 8 actually emerged very early on. The excerpt below is the beginning of the encounter in Example 8 and includes the officer's first contact with the civilian, whom he summons in line 2. Instead of giving a reason for initiating contact at the first opportunity as the officer did in Example 6, this officer begins to ask the civilian a series of questions while physically moving the civilian to the front of his police car so that their encounter will be recorded by the camera mounted on the dashboard. Thus, as the officer begins to search him, the civilian attempts to solicit an explanation regarding the officer's conduct (indicated with B->, in lines 25, 27, 28, 29). Without a frame for the encounter (i.e., why the officer initiated contact in the first place), the civilian begins to assume the worst. The civilian's rejections of or challenges to the officer's attempts to minimize what is happening (indicated with A->, lines 16, 32) further suggests he has begun to adopt a skeptical or even hostile orientation to the officer.

Example 9 [10]

```
2    IM1:     come on over here. get your
3             hands out of your pockets.
4             (pause)
5    CM1      it's out of my pockets.
6    IM1      what are you doing?
7    CM1      (unintelligible) my friend's house.
8    IM1      d- did you get drunk? a little drunk?
9    CM1      minorly.
```

```
10                 (pause)
11      IM1        okay. just listen to me. you're
12                 not under arrest. I'm just
13                 putting you over here okay?
14      CM1        all right.
15                 (pause)
16      CM1 A->    you're putting me against the
17                 car. don't give me a bunch of shit.
18      IM1        (unintelligible).
19                 (pause)
20      CM1        sir excuse me. what are you doing?
21      IM1        interlace your fingers. interlace your
22                 fingers like you're praying.
23      CM1        okay.
24                 (pause)
25      CM1 B->    what are you doing?
26                 (pause)
27      CM1 B->    what are you doing? uh
28      CM1 B->    Why're you taking me to jail.
29          B->    for what?
30      IM1        I didn't say you were going to jail.
31                 (pause)
32      CM1 A->    yeah but you're you're putting me in
33                 a cuff.
34                 (pause)
35      IM1        well you're not being a very good listener.
```

When the officer describes what's *not* happening (line 11-12, "you're not under arrest) the civilian rejects this claim as disingenuous; after the officer ignores the civilian's effort to solicit an explanation (lines 25 and 27), the civilian escalates by accusing the officer of arresting him (despite his immediately prior claims to the contrary, lines 28, and 29), and then challenges the officer's weak rejection of that accusation ("I didn't say you were going..."). Although the officer initiated this encounter afterobserving a fairly minor offense, the way he manages its beginning engenders a level of distrust and conflict that shapes the rest of the interaction.

This example reflects a broader pattern: Civilians may cooperate with warfighters at the beginning of an encounter (as warfighters secure them and the scene) even when warfighters have not yet provided a frame for the encounter. This cooperation will be short-lived, however, if warfighters begin pursuing other matters (such as posing questions, initiating searches, etc.) before giving their reason for beginning the encounter in the first place. This may reflect how participants make sense of encounters more generally: when an encounter has been initiated for some reason, the initiating party typically gives the basis for the encounter as part of its opening.[11] However, if a warfighter directly starts to conduct some piece of that business, for example by posing

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[11] If officers have been called to a scene by one of the civilians who is present, these expectations are reversed: that civilian has to offer an explanation for having called, often even though they have already provided such an explanation to the emergency telecommunication center. People expect the person who initiated the contact in the first place to provide the reason for an encounter, and to do so at the earliest possible opportunity.

questions, the civilian will assume that warfighter will not offer an explanation and begin to pursue one.

Using bodies to frame encounters:
In the cases examined above, we have mostly focused on how officers used language to frame encounters, through explanations; but officers and warfighters can also use body movement and body placement to frame events and encounters. While body movement and positioning alone offer a much more restricted set of resources for conveying meaning than language does, how participants move and position their bodies can indicate basic assumptions about what is going on.

How warfighters position their own and others' bodies can go some way toward establishing the type of encounter being initiated. As background, in ordinary encounters between acquaintances, friends or family members, humans move their own bodies into more or less symmetrical spatial positions and matching postures that enable each person to have the same access to others (e.g., so that the parties are looking at each other's faces, etc.) This positioning and the forms of eye contact and relaxed body posture that it enables establish a default interpretive framework that the parties use to understand their own and the other party's body positioning and movement as they change during the encounter. It is this framework, for example, that enables one to see that the other party is looking past the current speaker for others, or that a person who has adopted a position with the hips and trunk pointing outside of the encounter and the head and shoulders positioned to sustain eye contact is preparing to leave, and so on. The ways that persons position their bodies in an encounter also supply a more global framework that conveys the parties' assumptions about the encounter as a whole and about likely trajectories.

Generally, where one party moves the other into a different and specifically asymmetrical arrangement, the moved party will assume that the moving was done for a reason. Thus, when warfighters move civilian, the latter may ask for a reason or may simply assume that they know the reason. Given the asymmetry asserted by such movements, the assumptions that civilians make will likely be negative or hostile unless warfighters take steps to provide an alternative, more neutral framing of events.

In several examples above, the officers positioned themselves and the civilians in ways that contrast sharply with the default physical arrangement humans adopt in ordinary encounters. When officers moved civilians into a specific or special location, e.g., in front of a car, or had them adopt a specific body position (e.g., with the civilian facing away from the officer) or body configuration (e.g., with the civilian's hands behind his/her back, or fingers interlaced, etc.), the officers conveyed that security was an overriding concern. This is in part conveyed by the forms of asymmetry established by these different methods of body positioning and movement. Obviously these forms of body positioning and placement are designed to constrain civilian movement, restrict the access that civilians have to the officers, and give officers every possible advantage in managing civilian bodies. And in the most basic sense, by placing civilians in such positions officers establish a hierarchical relationship, with one body being moved and constrained and the other doing the moving and constraining. (These asymmetries will

be heightened when officers or warfighters use weapons to motivate civilian compliance).

These forms of body positioning and the methods by which they are established[12] communicate a global interpretive framework because they convey the warfighters' basic orientation to the civilians (including assumptions about the level of threat they may pose, how compliant the warfighter anticipates they will be, and so on) as well as the type of encounter that is under way and its most likely trajectory. Paradoxically, this is most clearly demonstrated in occasions where warfighters do not provide an explanation for the encounter or for what prompted them to position the civilian's body in specific ways. We can also note that when a civilian perceives a discrepancy between the placement and positing of his body and what a warfighter claims about the encounter, the civilian will treat body placement and positioning as communicating what is actually happening Thus such forms of body positioning also convey which outcomes are more and less likely, thereby establishing a set of expectations against which the warfighter's current and future conduct will be assessed.

If warfighters approach civilians and simply begin to engage them, through talk or other body conduct, they will convey their understanding that the civilians do not pose a threat, that the encounter is consensual, and that the encounter will be resolved in such a way that both parties depart at its conclusion. By contrast, if warfighters position the civilians' bodies, how they do so will convey varying levels of mistrust. When warfighters can communicate a basis for their actions, they also provide a way for civilians to understand how and why their actions (like putting hands in pockets) may be viewed as problematic.

Some other possible resources:
When parties do not share a common language, explaining why an encounter is being initiated or what a warfighter is doing may not always be possible. Given the importance of framing events as a resource for promoting cooperation, however, it is important to figure out ways to overcome this problem. Several alternatives are possible:

1. If the parties share few or no linguistic resources, warfighters will have little chance of developing the level of shared understanding required for complex interaction. This will dramatically limit what is possible in terms of the types of encounters warfighters pursue and the resources available for framing them. In such situations warfighters may have to rely on gesture and body movement to establish a common set of referents, and then use these to fashion a common understanding of the encounter. For example, warfighters can use gesture and body movement to establish references to self and other (using pointing or other gestures), references to actions (e.g., by pointing to the eyes to indicate looking, seeing, or searching, the legs or fingers to indicate walking, the arms to indicate holding, hitting, etc.); and references to third parties, objects and places (using gestures and pointing, as well as symbols, pictures or representations). Once a set of basic resources has been established, the parties can combine these to form more complex structures, e.g., pointing to self, then indicating walking, then looking, to indicate a search on foot.

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[12] Which can range from the threat of force conveyed by the display of guns or other weapons, the use of hands to physically position others, and various symbolic forms of communication such as talk, gesture or physical demonstration.

Finally, warfighters need to be able to establish whether they have understood and been understood by others. In circumstances with few shared resources, the use of modified repetition can help to establish understanding or uncover misunderstandings. Simple modifications made to one repetition of a series of gestures can be used to convey the warfighter's understanding, and not initiating a new action or otherwise competing with the civilian. For example, warfighters can use gestures to track which party will perform which actions, and so on. Even a small preface to the series of gestures (like pointing to the head to convey understanding, or nodding) can convey that the gesture is a response and not a new communication. Though it can be laborious to interact in this way, the ordering of these steps (i.e., establishing a common set of referents first, combining these to compose more complex messages, and using modified repetition of the messages conveyed by others to establish mutual understanding) greatly simplifies communication and enables participants to recognize and deal with problems in understanding.

2. When warfighters are in a locale long enough to establish routines, they will find themselves initiating encounters to pursue a regular set of goals. This regularity in their activities should allow for development of durable communication methods (e.g., cards) to explain the reason for the encounter. Where literacy rates are low, warfighters can use pictures, or learn one or two words associated with each mission. Either of these methods will be especially effective where civilians see warfighters with some frequency. In those cases, civilians will know from their own and others' experience the range of reasons why warfighters typically initiate encounters. While this may not cover novel or idiosyncratic reasons for initiating an encounter, it should cover the most frequent encounter types.

It should be noted that it is common to talk even when the parties in an encounter do not share a language, so there is no need to avoid talking while using a form of sign language. Talking can be useful because it helps other warfighters to know what the lead warfighter is doing, thereby enabling them to work as a team. Even for civilians, though, talk can facilitate communication and convey meaning. For example, talk can convey when a person is composing an action and when they are done, thereby facilitating turn taking. In addition, talk can also convey emotional tenor, which can be an especially important resource when warfighters wish to avoid appearing threatening to civilians.

Skills

> - Warfighters should have a range of linguistic, embodied (e.g., gesture, body movement and body positioning) and material (e.g., printed cards, pictures) resources to draw on in framing encounters, activities and actions. The aim is to reduce civilian uncertainty about the nature and aim of an encounter and thereby to promote cooperation. In addition, warfighters should be able to use these same resources to frame encounters in terms of giving or receiving help. A "help" frame can be used to establish a cooperative alignment between participants that promotes mission completion.

- Warfighters should be aware that the ways they position their bodies (as well as the bodies of their civilian counterparts) inevitably communicate assumptions about the nature of an encounter, the threat level posed by the civilian, and the most likely outcome of the encounter. Knowing this, warfighters should track where alterations in body positioning and movement will communicate a change to one or more of these dimensions. More generally, when warfighters seek cooperation from civilians they should avoid surprising them if possible. Except in encounters where concealed positions and intent can be used to gain a strategic advantage, moves that cannot be anticipated are likely to generate resistance from citizens.

- Warfighters are likely to encounter trouble when a civilian perceives inconsistencies between the body placement and positioning established by the warfighter and the warfighter's claims about what is happening. In such cases, civilians are likely to be skeptical of the claims and treat the placement and positioning of their body as communicating what's actually going on.

- Once warfighters have established a position relative to civilians (and when relevant, positioned the bodies of civilians), the positions can be used to make inferences about activities and aims. Warfighters should be able to use close observational skills (and touch, when relevant) to detect alterations in the positioning of civilians and assess the import of these moves, assess whether they project a threat, cooperation, or some other alternative.

- Establish basic communication even without a shared language:
  A. Use gesture and body movement to establish the some of the basic resources necessary for communication: references to self and other (using pointing or other gestures), references to actions (e.g., by pointing to the eyes to indicate looking/seeing/searching), and references to third parties, objects and places.
  B. Combine these to form more complex structures, e.g., pointing to self, then indicating walking, then looking, to indicate a search on foot. In using this building block method, warfighters can establish effective communication and demonstrate to civilians how to do the same.
  C. Use modified repetition to establish that they understand others or that others have understood them.

- Track approaches used and occasions when warfighters encounter troubles, failures or missed opportunities associated with communication; this knowledge can be used to plan for future encounters. For example, if warfighters on patrol find that civilians routinely misunderstand what they are doing, or that some routine task such iris scanning is difficult to coordinate, they might anticipate this possibility on future outings and prepare way to circumvent trouble. Simple signs, cards or pictures can facilitate communication and thus cooperation. This requires anticipatory planning, however: it requires that warfighters pay careful attention to their daily activities and reflect on how they can make their encounters with civilians more effective. If warfighters encounter a form of trouble for a second time, they should have a plan in place (and an associated set of material resources) that will enable them to address it the next time it arises.

Abilities/Attitudes

- Take into account and use what civilians know, understand and expect. The ways that warfighters frame encounters enable civilian cooperation in two basic ways: First, by shaping civilian expectations about what is happening and what will happen. Second, by aligning the parties with respect to the course of action underway (as in the case of using a "help" frame to organize the parties into benefactor and beneficiary). Evidently, both ways of enabling cooperation depend directly on how civilians understand what is happening and on their expectations about what will happen next. When warfighters upset those expectations, civilians are likely to resist, challenge, or otherwise indicate some form of trouble. The likelihood of encountering trouble can be significantly diminished by managing the expectations civilians have for what is happening or will happen.

- Remain flexible in managing divergent points of view. It will not be uncommon for civilians to have an understanding of people (including themselves) and events that diverges significantly from the warfighter's. Adopt a judicious attitude when figuring out how to manage these differences. In some cases it may be useful for the warfighter to convey his/her understanding of who s/he is and what s/he is doing, but s/he should not anticipate that civilians will immediately accept that view. Nonetheless, warfighters should not ignore how civilians understand events and people. Often warfighters can adapt their actions to civilians' understanding of events as a method for securing their cooperation.

Developing a Common Understanding: Offering or Requesting Help
[UNH]

Knowledge

As mentioned in the section above on "Developing a Common Understanding of an Encounter", one way to frame an encounter is to offer or to request help. A socially skilled stranger, it could be said, is someone who conveys benign intentions toward others and acts positively on their behalf to make them feel safe, from physical threat and also from emotional injury and/or social miscalculation. Researchers have found that positive affect, or feeling good, is associated with an increased incidence of helping behavior (Isen, 1984; Isen and Levin, 1972). Further, the particular emotion of gratitude, which is enhanced when one receives help, is associated with a greater incidence of helping behavior on the part of the receiver (Bartlett and DeSteno, 2006). We expect that helping behavior on the part of warfighters can increase positive affect and gratitude among civilians, as well as create an interactional bias such that civilians will be more inclined toward reciprocal help and cooperation with warfighters.

One way warfighters can convey an interest in the civilian's welfare is to frame help as the reason for the encounter. When someone initiates interaction, they typically give a reason for doing so if none is otherwise apparent. For example, in phone calls between acquaintances and family members, soon after greetings and identifications are made, callers may say, "The reason I'm calling is…", or the call recipient may solicit a reason, as in, "So what's going on?" (purely social calls may be framed as such with, "I was just calling to say 'hi'"). In institutional interactions such as medical exams, doctors solicit the reason for the patient's visit with such questions as, "What brings you here today?". In traffic stops, police will often say something like "The reason I stopped you is…".

Framing an encounter as being initiated for the purpose of providing help of some sort, as in "We're here to help", puts an encounter on a prosocial footing from the start and helps to reduce tension and promote cooperation. It allows subsequent activities by warfighters to be understood by civilians as being undertaken for their benefit. In a situation in which civilians are likely to feel hostility or at least ambivalence toward a foreign military presence, framing an encounter as being about help has several benefits:

> - The offer of help at the outset of and as the reason for interaction provides an ongoing context for the warfighter's activities to be understood as being undertaken for prosocial motives. This should reduce conflict and promote cooperation.

- Offering help as the reason for the encounter bypasses immediate resistance associated with negative or purely instrumental reasons (e.g., "We're here to ask some questions"; "We need to check all vehicles"), and buys time while the parties build trust and work toward a more positive orientation toward one another.

- Offering help as the reason for the encounter gives civilians a practical stake in cooperating.

- Offering help as the reason for the encounter helps civilians associate positive personality qualities with warfighters, such as kindness, generosity, trustworthiness, etc.

- Offering help as the reason for the encounter appeals to a reciprocal helping or prosocial orientation by civilians.

While a help frame may meet with suspicion or resistance or may be turned down, it nonetheless works to positively frame subsequent warfighter activities in ways that may reduce tension and conflict and promote cooperation toward the accomplishment of warfighter tasks. Prior to an encounter, warfighters should identify and be aware of the kinds of things that can be viewed as help by civilians.

Skills

Whenever feasible, the warfighter should state early in the interaction that the reason for the encounter is to provide help of some form to the civilian population, the government, local police, or an individual. This can be help in general, or more specific help in the form of medical supplies, food, protection from insurgents, and so on. Typically the reason for the encounter is given as part of an introduction.

In the example below, a warfighter enters the home of key leaders and, from the doorway, presents a gift and introduces himself. As part of these initial opening moves, and as part of the introduction in particular, he provides a reason for the encounter:

Example 10 [13]

After entering the house and presenting food through interpreter:

1 Warfighter: I'm Lieutenant Brock. I'm leading a patrol of US Army soldiers.
2   We're a brigade combat team here to assist the Indian government.

In the next example, the warfighter provides a reason for the encounter as part of his introduction. This example highlights that if a reason for the encounter is not given, or is not made clear enough, civilians may specifically ask for one. This evidences the

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[13] Video: Group 3 with Elders

importance of that reason to civilians for giving them an understanding of the encounter.

Example 11   [14]

1   Civilian: Who <u>are</u> you?   [asked through translator]
2   Warfighter: We're part of the United States Army. We're here to try to see how we 3
        can help you with the insurgents groups.
                ((a few moments later))
4   Civilian: Why are you here? [through translator]
5   Warfighter:We're here to see how we can help you and the people of this town
6   adapt to the growing situation with the insurgents in this area.

An offer of help may be accepted, but it also may be rejected, as in Example 12.

Example 12   [15]

1   Warfighter: We're here as our fellow police chief, we're here to uh help you
2   with the (unintelligible) you might need uh within your community
3   here.
3   Translator: He says right now he doesn't need any help.

Refusals are likely due to civilians' perceptions that offers of help are primarily instrumental, i.e. in the service of the goals of the warfighters and the military, and that acceptance of help will associate them with the U.S. military in ways that will impact them negatively with their neighbors or generate reciprocal obligations that they don't want to be responsible for. The next example, which shows a civilian treating an offer of help with suspicion, illustrates that such perceptions by civilians may be at the forefront of their decisions to accept help or not:

Example 13   [16]

1   Warfighter: We're in the area we're uh we're just kind of patrolling
2   around we're taking a look at things uh we're here to
3   assist you.
4   Civilian: What kind of help do you want to do? [through Translator]
5   Warfighter: We're here with uh different patrols uh we're gonna look at things
6   uh be some eyes and ears for ya.
7   Translator: He says are you here just to look around (at things)
8   or are you here to help?
9   Warfighter: We're here to help.
10 Translator: He can help you.
11 Warfighter: Thank you.

Even when a civilian rejects the framing of an encounter as about help, offering help as the reason for the encounter nonetheless provides a framing of subsequent warfighter

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[14] Video: AWALP Group 1 Elders
[15] Video: AWALP Hotel Auguri
[16] Video: AWALP Police Chief introduction

tasks as ostensibly being undertaken for the benefit of civilians. Whether or not help is eventually accepted, offering it or formulating tasks as being undertaken to help civilians, conveys a prosocial motive for the work that warfighters must carry out. This is evident in the next example; the civilian rejects the need for help (line 6), but then gives the OK for the warfighters to go ahead with their tasks which were initially framed, and framed again after the rejection (line 9), as being undertaken for the benefit of the community:

Example 14   [17]

After introductions are made:
1   Warfighter: We're trying to get to know the local populace. We believe that
2   some of the insurgents have moved to this area. So we wanna
3   provide security and try to disrupt (them) so that they won't
4   interfere with um your town
5   (pause)
6   Civilian: No insurgents.
7   Warfighter: There's no insurgents?
8   Civilian: No.
9   Warfighter: Okay uh we're just gonna pass through just let me know if
10   you see anything. We're just gonna do a quick patrol of the
11   area uhm we're not gonna be interfering with anybody,
12   (unintelligible). We don't wanna interfere with
13   uh your daily lives we just wanna talk to some of your people
14   get to know uh your population if that's okay.
15   (pause)
16   WF: Is that okay?
17   Civilian: [*nods yes*]

> - Whenever feasible, warfighters should convey early in the interaction, as part of their self- introduction to civilians, that their goal is to provide help. They can do this as a statement (e.g., "We're here to help, provide security, medical assistance") or a question, (e.g., "What kind of assistance does your community need from us?").

> - Help may be treated with suspicion or rejected by civilians. Warfighters should provide reassurance and move ahead with their tasks.

Abilities/Attitudes

> - Warfighters should cultivate an authentic sense of care for civilians, one that can be expressed in believable ways at the outset of interaction. This may require some genuine introspection.

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[17] Video: TBS First Platoon KLE

- Warfighters should have an awareness of what kinds of things civilians need — food, medicine, protection, and less tangible things like respect and empathy.

- Warfighters should be aware of the practical advantages that strategically positioned help actions potentially offer, as well as reasons for civilian resistance and the benefits of nonetheless employing the help frame as a basis for carrying out their work.

Acknowledge Civilians' Autonomy
[UCSB]

Knowledge

How warfighters compose actions such as commands or questions to civilians can influence the ways that civilians respond. This is especially true when those actions request cooperation from the civilian – for example, when warfighters ask civilians to do something (e.g., to turn around, move, etc.). The design of such actions by the warfighter can vary considerably: some actions are designed to demand or presume compliance while others invite a civilian to participate cooperatively. When warfighters invite cooperation, they treat civilians as autonomous, i.e., as capable of voluntarily participating. When warfighters give commands or use threats to compel obedience, they impinge on a civilian's autonomy (e.g., their autonomy to make decisions). Prior research by social psychologists and the qualitative research effort in SSIM suggests that when warfighters acknowledge a civilian's autonomy, (i) the civilian is more likely to cooperate, (ii) the civilian will comply more quickly, and (iii) the participants are more likely to cooperatively complete the encounter's goal.

Across a very broad range of cultures and types of encounter, the ways that people design actions, using language or embodied conduct reflect a concern for each person's desire to be positively regarded ("positive rites") – and/or desire to be unimpeded ("negative rites"). For example, drivers often become upset when another driver cuts in front of them, even when there is no risk of an accident, or enters the lane in a way that requires the first driver to slow down. The negative emotions arise because the other driver is impeding the first driver's progress and thus impinging on his/her "negative rites". Similarly, failing to acknowledge or greet a person you know may cause them to become upset because the failure violates his/her "positive rites". A great deal of what is commonly referred to as "showing respect for another person" falls under these concepts. Every language known to scientists has a large variety of ways that participants can use to adjust how their actions respect such positive and negative rites. The ubiquity of such ways suggests just how central these basic rites are to the management of social relations in everyday life.

The import of positive and negative rites can be appreciated across many different aspects of social interaction. Our focus here is on how warfighters design the actions they use to request cooperation. In most cases, warfighters can design actions that respect a recipient's autonomy (or not) by designing them to acknowledge (or transgress) a civilian's positive and negative rites.

In looking at the ways actions respect or violate/invade the personal autonomy of a civilian, it is important to keep in mind that we are not considering whether the civilian can actually choose to comply or not; in most cases civilians will not have a choice and must comply. Instead, at issue is the degree to which warfighters allow civilians to choose to cooperate or to act as if they are able to choose. This might be called "ritualized" deference to the civilian. Maintaining a commitment to such ritualized

deference is critical. These methods will not succeed in encouraging civilian cooperation or conveying respect if civilians perceive that warfighters are actually mocking their possibility of choice.

We will first show variations in how actions can be designed using language, then look at how other forms of body behavior can be used in similar ways. The primary concern is the degree to which a warfighter's actions acknowledge that a recipient's response is produced by coercion or by voluntary cooperation. For example, to ask or tell someone to sit down, warfighters can choose between different formats. For example:

1. Can you sit down? [request]
2. Would you care to have a seat? [offer/invitation]
3. Sit down (or "sit!") [directive/command]
4. Sit down or I will make you sit down [directive + threat] ⌞L SEP⌟

These vary in the degree to which they treat the civilian's next action as the product of voluntary cooperation (as in 1 and 2), compliance with a demand (as in 3), or coercion (as in 4). Thus, these actions vary in how much they respect the civilian's negative rites (the right to be unimpeded). The first two minimize coercion and the latter two maximize it. In addition, the latter two options may impinge on the civilian's positive rites (desire to be positively regarded) by assuming that a civilian wouldn't comply if given a choice, or by treating coercion as necessary to gain compliance. The use of an interrogative (as in 1 and 2, the request and offer/invitation) encodes the relevance of choice in the grammatical form used, and thus give the option of choosing what will happen and treating them as capable of choosing. By contrast, commands presuppose a recipients' acquiescence. In addition, 3 and 4 increasingly demonstrate the force that is not being used and that is one source of a warfighter's social authority.

A similar range of actions can be composed using body behavior. For example, a warfighter can gesture to the ground (e.g., with palm up) to invite a person to sit down (analogous to 1 and 2), or aggressively point to the ground (with an extended hand, or finger used in a jabbing motion) to command him or her to do so (analogous to 3). As with the language-based examples, one can also introduce the threat of force by using a gun or other weapon to point to the ground (analogous to 4). In most cases warfighters will use talk and body behavior to produce such actions, even when the participants do not share a common language. Since warfighters will most likely talk when composing such actions,, even if the civilian may not understand the language, *how* they speak (e.g., the volume, pace, and voicing the speaker uses) will matter because the non-linguistic aspects of the speech will convey the emotional valence of the initiating action, or at least provide a window into the emotional state of the speaker.

There are a variety of other ways to acknowledge civilians' positive and negative rites. Some examples are:

Do you mind if [action]?
[action], okay? (e.g. "I'm going to search your car, okay?")
[action] + [explanation] (e.g. "Put your hands on the car, since we know you've got that gun?")

Warfighters can also appeal to a civilian's desire to be positively regarded (positive rites) by indicate the warfighter's own interest in the desired outcome. For example, warfighters can position civilians as benefactors and themselves as beneficiaries, as in:

> [action] for me
> I need you to [action]
> please [action]

Skills

> - **Vary forms of requests/commands, and match forms to contexts**: Warfighters should be able to design actions using a variety of forms, be aware of how aggressive each form is, and have some awareness of the contexts in which each form will be most effective or necessary. Commands and other assertive forms will be vital in dangerous situations, but these should not be relied on as a shortcut for establishing control in a situation where less aggressive forms could be used. In routine encounters the aggressive forms may escalate conflict or invite resistance.

> - **Gradual, step-by-step escalation:** In addition to having a range of forms available to them, warfighters should be prepared to carefully choose what form to use so as to enable a step-by-step escalation when civilians do not cooperate.

> - **Differentiate between compelling a new action versus stopping an action in progress:** The use of these forms will vary depending on whether warfighters aim to stop some action in progress (e.g., an attempt to flee) or compel a new action (e.g., sit down, stand up, move). Attempts to stop an action in progress may require more assertive techniques, while attempts to compel action will benefit from less assertive methods. In addition, there are considerable differences between actions that request a physical action (such as sitting, standing, walking, etc.) versus speech (such as giving information).

Abilities/Attitudes

- **Err in the direction of showing respect:** Whether or not warfighters know the persons they are interacting with, civilians will interpret the ways that warfighters design their actions as reflecting assumptions and attitudes toward the civilians. Under these circumstances warfighters will inevitably make mistakes. But it is easier to recover from giving someone too much respect than it is to recover from not giving them enough. Treating a low-status person with respect may not lead to problems, or may be taken as humorous, but failing to treat someone with the respect they believe they are due will be interpreted as an insult or worse.

- **Non-aggressive actions can be used to learn about civilian attitudes:** When warfighters give civilians the opportunity to cooperate, they can learn something about the civilians from how the civilians respond. If civilians cooperate, the parties may begin to establish some mutual trust. However, if warfighters simply give orders and coerce compliance, they never know whether the civilians would have cooperated on their own, and they may also undermine the possibility of future cooperative relations.

Rapport Building

[Georgetown]

Knowledge

Rapport building refers to the ways in which we build positive relationships. It can lead to a successful interaction, a positive perception of the other participants, and an overall successful mission. For example, studies (2) have found that when interviewers put effort into building rapport, interviewees provided more correct bits of information. Rapport can be built in many ways; three of the most important rapport-building skills are situationally appropriate rituals, framing the interaction as helpful, and relationship rituals.

Situationally appropriate rituals include greetings, apologies, expressions of gratitude, and farewells. The way we interact at each stage of an encounter affects the way that the encounter unfolds. During greetings, people implicitly or explicitly suggest an approach to the task at hand and to their relationships with other participants. In this way, greetings set the tone for the interaction. They can be used to establish rapport and "grease the wheels" for accomplishing certain goals (e.g. cooperation, information gathering), or they can unintentionally alienate others. People use various verbal and nonverbal techniques to indicate a desire to begin an interaction. Verbal greetings such as "hello" or "namaste" work in combination with techniques such as eye contact, body orientation, hand waving, and head nodding as part of the process of opening an interaction. The way people end an interaction is also crucial. As with the verbal and nonverbal techniques used for opening an interaction, there are many ways people can close an interaction. They may summarize what has been accomplished during the interaction, offer information about the next time an interaction will occur, or simply offer thanks and parting rituals (e.g. "goodbye" or "namaste").

The way people frame an interaction can also contribute to rapport building. Framing refers to the lens through which we view and act within an interaction. In order to correctly interpret conversation the way it is intended, each person must understand what "frame" they are in, whether it is joking, fighting, lecturing, etc. Framing an interaction as help can engender goodwill among the civilian population and helps in achieving cooperation (see also the section in this document on "Developing a Common Understanding of an Encounter"). When warfighters ask civilians about their problems and offer help and protection, the whole interaction is more likely to be successful.

Relationship rituals encompass the types of rapport building that are not necessarily expected within the interaction, but if employed can create goodwill and mission success. These include reassuring, complimenting, small talk, and humor, among others. While not engaging in a greeting ritual would seem surprising and could hinder interaction, relationship rituals are optional and can augment other rapport building strategies. Warfighters' use of relationship rituals leads to more positive end states and evaluations of the interaction as successful.

- Many interactions include greetings, expressions of gratitude, respect, or deference, and farewells. Each of these has a function in the interaction.

- People sometimes have different understandings of what the purpose or tone ("frame") of an encounter is.

- There are a range of rituals available to contribute to the positive nature of an interaction, including reassuring, complimenting, small talk, humor, and so on.

Skills

- Social rituals are, in many situations, as important as the tactical goals of an encounter. For example, in a key leader engagement, the tactical goal may be to gather information, but greetings, expressions of gratitude, and farewells can be important to facilitate the relationship.

- Be able to recognize when a person you're interacting with may have a different framing of the interaction than you do.

- Look for signals that people may provide as to what they believe the frame to be (for example, smiling, laughing, or maintaining a more somber appearance).

- Be able to recognize the appropriate moments to engage in these rituals.

Abilities/Attitudes

- Use verbal and nonverbal greetings, expressions of gratitude, and farewells when appropriate.

- When appropriate, explicitly explain what you believe the frame to be, or provide implicit signals (for example, smiling, laughing, or maintaining a more somber appearance).

- Employ rituals such as reassurance, compliments, small talk, humor and so on.

Trouble Recovery
[Georgetown]

Knowledge

Trouble inevitably arises in interaction even for skilled interlocutors. Interactional trouble can manifest in various ways. Many of the trouble sources that occur are related to warfighters' simultaneous attention to tactical or security issues along with the communicative event. For example, warfighters may not maintain eye contact with people if they are looking down at their notepad in order to write down information or looking around the room for security purposes. Civilians can interpret this lack of eye contact as a sign of disengagement or lack of respect—a prominent trouble source that can inhibit interactional success. The recognition that trouble has occurred and the identification of its source are crucial. Generally, it is better for the interlocutor who is responsible for the trouble to initiate and complete the recovery (19). In addition, we have found that it is preferable for recovery to occur closer in time to the trouble source and in a relatively more explicit manner. In the case of lack of eye contact as a trouble source, there are various types of recovery. Warfighters can explicitly address the trouble and apologize (e.g. "I'm sorry I have to keep writing while we're talking") or they can recover by assigning a scribe to take notes or a guardian angel to maintain security. Recognition of and recovery from interactional trouble is critical for warfighters to achieve interactional success.

Aspects of recovery from trouble include who initiates the recovery attempt, when they do so, and how explicitly they address the trouble.

- It is impossible not to make mistakes in social interaction, in both familiar and unfamiliar settings.

- It can be particularly difficult to balance tactical and interpersonal needs in interaction, and this is often a source of interactional trouble for warfighters.

- There are better and worse ways to recover from social mistakes. It is better to initiate your own trouble recovery than to have someone else, especially a civilian, initiate the trouble recovery. It is also better to complete the trouble recovery yourself than to rely on someone else. In terms of timing, it is generally better to allow as minimal a time delay as possible between a trouble source and the trouble recovery. Finally, it is best to be as explicit as possible when conducting trouble recovery.

Skills

- Be able to recognize when you have made a social mistake, whether it is failing to adapt to unfamiliar norms, focusing on tactical needs at the expense of interpersonal needs, or something different.

Abilities/Attitudes

- When you recognize a mistake you have made, correct it as quickly as possible, in an explicit manner when possible.

Empathy

[UNH]

Knowledge

By *empathy* we mean actions warfighters use to console others or ameliorate their distress or pain. This distress or pain may be emotional or physical, and can be expressed or experienced by civilians in a variety of ways.

Warfighters should be on the lookout for behaviors by which civilians convey insecurity, fear, mistrust, anger, and/or hostility. Civilians may do this by yelling, cursing, staring intently at warfighters, and moving about in an agitated manner; alternately, they may refuse to talk at all, avert their gaze, or otherwise seek to physically withdraw. These behaviors may be evident at virtually any point in an interaction, such as when contact is first made, questions are asked, or compliance is sought. Civilians may also directly express their affective or physical distress through complaints (e.g., "You're harassing my people!", "That hurts!") and related actions like crying.

In addition to being alert to expressions of distress and pain, warfighters should be on the lookout for situations in which civilians may be experiencing negative emotional or physical states but do not necessarily express them. Hunger, illness, injury, and so forth, in addition to the aforementioned emotional states, might be inferred from observation or knowledge that warfighters have of civilians' circumstances. Being alert and responsive to the civilian's circumstances, as well as to their direct expressions of distress, is part of the empathetic toolkit that warfighters can draw from.

In short, the empathetic responses that warfighters make should be directed to a perceived problem that a civilian is experiencing, whether that problem is directly conveyed by the civilian or whether it can be inferred from the situation.

> - A civilian's distress or pain may be directly expressed through complaints ("You're harassing my people!") or through actions such as crying, yelling, moving agitatedly, withdrawing, and so on.

> - Warfighters should not only recognize direct expressions of civilians' distress, but also use observation and their knowledge of the civilian's circumstances to infer when an empathetic response would be helpful.

Skills

With this skill, a warfighter recognizes civilians' expressions of distress and pain, and is alert to the circumstances that might give rise to civilians experiencing distress and pain. A warfighter can provide empathetic responses that include "empathy tokens", reassurances, apologies, and, when possible, remedies to improve the civilian's situation.

- Empathetic responses include responses such as "I understand" or "I see", reassurances (e.g., "We're just here to help", "Everything will be okay"), apologies ("I'm sorry"), and when possible, solutions to civilians' problems (e.g., getting them medicine, helping them get physically comfortable, etc.).

- Warfighters can sidestep accusations by focusing their empathetic responses on CIV's loss/distress rather than on their (warfighter's) culpability for that loss

- Putting an empathetic response in personal terms (e.g., "I don't want your children to get shot") makes for a powerful appeal.

- Warfighters should foresee civilians' discomfort in situations of restraint and take measures to make them more comfortable.

- If a warfighter makes explicit her/his concern for civilians' well-being when giving directives, it will help promote cooperation.

Examples of skills in use

Responding to Complaints with Empathy

In Example 15, the civilian's distress and agitation are evident in a series of complaints he makes on lines 3, 5, and 9. The warfighter responds with reassurances (lines 4, 8), an apology (line 7) and a remedy (line 9: "we'd like your help in helping us…"). Thus, the warfighter tries several ways to ameliorate the civilian's distress so that the warfighter can carry on with his work. At line 10, he is successful in that the civilian responds positively to the request to talk that was initiated in line 1.

Example 15 [18]

The warfighter has sat down to talk with a civilian.

1	WF:	We'd like to talk with you and meet with you and
2		find out a little bit more about the place.
3	CIV:	You here. You here. Me. <u>What</u> harass people. Why?
4	WF:	We're just trying to make sure things are safe around here.
5	CIV:	No noise no nothing. You walk in town and
6		everything go! Why?!
7	WF:	We're sorry.
8		We wanna help yo[u help the people,

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[18] Video: TBS 3rd Platoon KLE

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9   CIV:                               [How do you protect when you harass my
people?!
10  WF:          I don't know but we'd like your help in helping us do it right.
11  CIV:         So what do you need to know
```

Sidestepping Accusations with Empathy

Complaints by civilians may verge on being accusations in that they blame warfighters for the civilians' suffering. In Example 16, the civilian makes a complaint in line 2 that is a strong indictment of warfighters and/or the U.S. Government. The warfighter sidesteps this and focuses on the civilian's loss by offering an empathetic response in the form of condolences in line 5.

Example 16   [19]

The warfighter has been interrogating the civilian and asks questions about his background.

```
1   WF:          Is your mother still alive?
2   CIV:         No.  You killed her.
3   WF:          How about your father.
4   CIV:         He's dead.
5   WF:          I'm sorry, sir, for your loss.
```

Personalizing the Empathetic Response

The personalization of an empathetic response, in contrast to one made on behalf of an institution (as in Example 15), can be particularly powerful. In Example 17, a warfighter provides as a justification for his presence in the civilian's country a concern for the safety and wellbeing of the civilian and his children. This personalization of motive and the invocation of children make for a powerful empathetic appeal.

Example 17   [20]
```
1   WF:          I want to keep this a good place.
2   CIV:         good
3   WF:          Yes.  I want you to be happy with your children.
3   CIV:         I'm very happy.
3   WF:          Yeah.  I want you to be safe.  I don't want your children to get
4               shot by (enemy), by (violence).
```

Being Alert to Others' Experiences

As discussed above, warfighters should also be alert to situations that can give rise to civilian distress and pain, not just to their direct expressions of this. In Example 18, a

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[19] Video: Squad 1 TQing weapons dealer
[20] Video: TBS 6th Platoon Saudi Officer

warfighter foresees that a civilian may possibly be experiencing discomfort and takes measures to reduce his discomfort.

Example 18 [21]

The warfighter carefully helps the civilian, whose hands are restrained, to a chair for questioning.

1	WF:	*The warfighter carefully but gently searches the civilian's pockets*
2	WF:	Can you sit back comfortably?

Similarly, in Example 19, a warfighter foresees a situation that could be harmful to civilians and takes action on their behalf. An IED has been located and he tells people to stay back, telling them not only that there is an IED, but that he doesn't want them to get hurt.

Example 19 [22]

1	WF:	Hey sir, stay back!
2		Stay back! We have an IED over here. We don't want you to get hurt.

Example 19 also relates to with our research on compliance gaining. When warfighters or police give directives, giving an explanation treats people as entitled to a rationale for the intrusion on their autonomy and encourages cooperation. An explanation of concern for others' wellbeing makes civilian compliance a matter of self-interest, and would seem an especially good way to gain compliance.

Abilities/Attitudes

> - Warfighters should cultivate an authentic sense of caring for civilians, one that can be expressed in believable ways. Empathy, especially, turns on the ability to take the perspective of others. It requires a sensitivity to others' circumstances and, critically to warfighter/civilian interactions, a willingness to visibly demonstrate it via empathetic verbal and/or embodied means.

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[21] Video: Squad 1 TQing weapons dealer
[22] Video: TBS Cautioning Civilians to Stay Back

Quantitative Analyses of the Effect of Allowing Civilian Involvement
[SRI]

Introduction

Social scientists on our team hypothesized that police/civilian encounters may go more smoothly if the officer acknowledges requests, questions, or more generally actions by civilians which "expect" an answer, in the sense that if an answer is not forthcoming, it is felt to be missing. Such requests, questions, and other actions are called "initiating actions". An officer may acknowledge an initiating action in a variety of ways; they may respond partially or fully to it, explicitly defer responding directly to it, or merely indicate that they registered that an initiating action was made by the civilian. Alternately, an officer may suppress an initiating action. This could take the form of an explicit rejection or just ignoring the initiating action as if it had not happened. All initiating actions are either acknowledged or suppressed/ignored. It is important to note that acknowledgement or suppression of an initiating action should not be confused with granting or denying a request. For example, if a civilian asked to have handcuffs removed because they were uncomfortable, the officer could simultaneously acknowledge and deny the request, by explaining that the handcuffs cannot be removed as a matter of policy or safety.

It is believed that the same conclusions will hold true for encounters between warfighters and civilians as well. However, for reasons mentioned briefly below, insufficient data did not allow the exploration of these hypotheses in the military encounters that were available to us. The term "institutional representative" is used here to include both police officers and warfighters.

We performed descriptive and inferential statistics relating to several hypotheses pertaining to allowing or encouraging civilian involvement. The statistical results are presented below.

The first hypothesis was that institutional representatives' responses (acknowledgements or suppressions) to civilian initiating actions would be related to whether and how the encounter's project (or goal or main agenda item) was completed; specifically, that more acknowledgements or fewer suppressions would be positively correlated with cooperative project completion and negatively correlated with unilateral project completion. An encounter's project is considered to be unilaterally completed if the police used force to accomplish their ends. In some cases an encounter's project is not completed (e.g. if the civilian ran away and was not caught) or is completed by someone other than the main interacting institutional representative (e.g. if the civilian ran away and was caught by another person). These cases are excluded in the testing of this hypothesis.

The second hypothesis was that institutional representatives' responses (acknowledgements or suppressions) to civilian initiating actions would be related to the overall rate of civilian cooperation throughout the encounter; specifically, that more

acknowledgements or fewer suppressions would be positively correlated with a higher rate of cooperation or lower rate of noncooperation.

Finally the third hypothesis was that suppressions and acknowledgements of civilian initiating actions would have a near-term impact on civilians' responses to requests for cooperation. The second hypothesis above describes a relationship with noncooperation within the encounter as a whole, while this third hypothesis predicts that there will be an immediate, local effect on cooperation. The hypothesis was operationalized as follows: if there are an acknowledgement or a suppression and an institutional representative-provided opportunity for cooperation separated by 10 seconds or less (in either order, but with no intervening codes), and then within 15 seconds there is either a cooperation by the civilian or a pursuit or unilateral completion by the institutional representative, a pursuit or unilateral completion is more likely if the antecedent event was a suppression than if it was an acknowledgement.

Police data

Videos of encounters were drawn from four corpora of videos of naturally occurring law enforcement encounters: (a) SFPD, gathered by an ethnographer riding along in patrol cars; (b) SPD-1, which all include a use of force and are collected by a dashcam; (c) SPD-2, collected by dashcam; and (d) a Midwest Traffic corpus, also collected by dashcam. For quantitative analysis, a subset of encounters was selected according to the following criteria:

1. Audio quality
- Overall human impressionistic rating as "good" or "okay" audio quality
- Manual review of transcripts looking for inaudible (obviously missing) utterances
- Automatic review of transcripts counting the fraction of turns with unintelligible or uncertain stretches
    - For the Midwest corpus, this fraction was constrained to be less than about 35% of the turns
    - For the SPD and SFPD corpora, the encounters were ordered by this fraction and then selection was performed.
2. Number of active participants
- Prioritized encounters with one officer and one civilian, then two or more officers and one civilian, then one officer and more than one civilian.
- Bystanders and participants who contributed three or fewer turns to the encounter were not counted as active participants.
3. Variety of officers
    - We tried to avoid having individual officers appear in multiple encounters. This was nearly accomplished in the selection from the Midwest corpus. In the SFPD and SPD corpora, the constraint was relaxed so as to have more total encounters and more types of encounters, but still applied the constraint to some degree, especially in the SPD corpora. If there were multiple choices from a single officer in the SPD corpora, one reason for selection among them might be a longer encounter.

4. Interaction longer than about 10 turns
5. Encounter type
   - The biggest concern here was to avoid having the data be dominated by traffic stops. In the Midwest corpus, most of the encounters are stops for traffic infractions, but some are for other reasons, e.g. the officer offering help to someone stopped at the side of the road or responding to an accident. Many of the SPD-2 corpus are also traffic stops. In the Midwest corpus, the videos were clustered by officer pseudonym and then those meeting the above criteria were chosen, first taking encounters for reasons other than traffic infractions. For officers who had only traffic infraction encounters that met the above criteria, one encounter was randomly selected.
   - Wanting to limit the dominance of traffic stops also led to targeting an overall number from the Midwest corpus of about 15 encounters.
6. Civilian is not already in custody
   - If the civilian was already in custody when the video and audio started, that video was excluded from the set for quantitative analysis. If the civilian was taken into custody during the encounter, that was not a reason for exclusion.
7. Outcome
- Two additional Midwest encounters were added to the set as examples of poor outcomes.

Issues not taken into consideration:
1. Participants all visible on the video
2. Beginning of encounter included in recording
3. End of encounter included in recording

This selection process led to a set of law enforcement videos with the following characteristics. Note that each law enforcement video includes one encounter for analysis.

Table 1. Characteristics of police data selected for analysis

	Overall	SPD-1 (use of force)	SPD-2	SFPD	Midwest
Number of encounters	72	22	18	18	14
Average length of encounter	About 10 min.				
Number of unique officers (approximate)	55	21 (one officer also in SPD-2)	13	10	12
Number of encounters with one officer and one civilian (active participants)	44	3	14	13	14
Number of encounters with 2-6 officers and one civilian (active	17	17 (two have 2 Cs and one has 3,	2	2	0

	Overall	SPD-1 (use of force)	SPD-2	SFPD	Midwest
participants)		but one C is primary)			
Number of encounters with one offficer and 2-4 civilians (active participants)	6	1	2	3	0
Language barrier or limited English	2	1	1	0	0

Patterns of acknowledgement/suppression and near-term cooperation

The acknowledgement/suppression and cooperation/pursuit/unilateral completion codes showed different patterns and frequencies in the broad police corpus and the military corpus. In particular, suppressions, pursuits, and unilateral completions are much rarer in the military corpus, which contains generally more cooperation than the police corpus. This was not an expected result, and it suggests that data from these two corpora should be pooled only with caution. The counts of each code in the two corpora and the numbers of encounters that include each code are shown below in Table 2.

**Table 2. Counts of involvement-related codes and number of encounters affected**

Code	Broad police corpus Total count (Number of encounters affected)	Military corpus Total count (Number of encounters affected)
Acknowledgement of civilian initiating action	328 (37)	123 (35)
Suppression of civilian initiating action	258 (21)	13 (9)
Institutional representative-provided opportunity for cooperation	806 (39)	495 (41)
Near-term cooperation	625 (39)	441 (39)
Pursuit by institutional representative	189 (21)	31 (8)
Unilateral completion by institutional representative	33 (11)	11 (3)

Project completion codes

Encounters in the broad police corpus were coded according to whether and how the main project, or agenda item, of the encounter was completed. The major distinction in the project completion codes was between whether the project was achieved with the

cooperation of both the institutional representative and the civilian, or unilaterally (generally only a possibility for the institutional representative). Unilateral completion of the encounter's project is taken to be a worse outcome, as the civilian did not cooperate with the officer and the officer used force to complete their goal. The distribution of project completion codes is shown in Figure 1 for the encounters. This indicates reasonable numbers of both major categories. Unilaterally completed encounters comprise a greater fraction of this sample than of the universe of all encounters, so conclusions should not be drawn from this sample about the rate of use of force in general. In our analyses, however, it is beneficial to have an unusually high number of encounters involving the use of force as that allows more reliable estimation of parameters for what are in reality relatively uncommon events.

Figure 1. Distribution of project completion codes in broad police corpus encounters

Hypothesis testing

The first hypothesis was that the institutional representatives' responses (acknowledgements or suppressions) to civilian initiating actions would be related to project completion; specifically, that more acknowledgements or fewer suppressions would be positively correlated with cooperative project completion and negatively correlated with unilateral project completion. Available for analysis were 35 police videos marked with cooperative or unilateral project completion and acknowledgements and suppressions by the institutional representative (i.e. police officer) of civilian initiating actions. Histograms of the numbers of acknowledgements and suppressions were very skewed, with a long tail to the right. To make the acknowledgements approximately symmetrical, the number of acknowledgements in an encounter was raised to the power 0.3. Suppressions were represented by a binary variable indicating either 0-2 suppressions or 3 or more suppressions. This transformation reduces the impact of varying interaction lengths or other outliers (for example, one interaction had 55 suppressions) and is compatible with a prior discussion in which it was speculated that only the second or third suppression may start to make a difference, not the first one.

We performed a logistic regression to estimate the probability of cooperative project completion given these functions of acknowledgements and suppressions. We found that suppressions are a significant predictor (p-value = 0.002, coefficient = -3.04), while acknowledgements are not (p-value = 0.99, coefficient = -0.01). For the 13 encounters with 3 or more suppressions, the estimated probability of cooperative project completion is 0.23; for the 22 encounters with 2 or fewer suppressions, the estimated probability is 0.86. A contingency table represents this information below in Table 3. This corresponds to odds 20.3 times greater of a unilaterally completed project when suppressions are present than when there are no suppressions.

Table 3. Number of police encounters by number of suppressions and by cooperative vs. unilateral project completion

|	0-2 suppressions	3 or more suppressions
Cooperative project completion	19	3
Unilateral project completion	3	10

The second hypothesis was that institutional representatives' responses (acknowledgements or suppressions) to civilian initiating actions would be related to the overall rate of civilian cooperation throughout the encounter; specifically, that more acknowledgements or fewer suppressions would be positively correlated with a higher rate of cooperation or lower rate of noncooperation. The encounters were coded with opportunities provided by the institutional representative for cooperation, civilian cooperations with such opportunities, pursuits of cooperation by the institutional representative, and unilateral completions of an action by the institutional representative. These last two actions were taken as markers of noncooperation by the civilian. The rate of noncooperation was defined as the sum of the number of pursuits and the number of unilateral completions, divided by the number of times the officer provided an opportunity for civilian cooperation. (Note that this number can be greater than one, as a given opportunity may be followed by multiple pursuits and potentially a unilateral completion.) Again, a transformation was applied to reduce the effect of outliers and lead to a less skewed distribution; the rate of noncooperation was raised to the power 0.3.

The same transformations were applied as noted for the first hypothesis above to the acknowledgements and suppressions, i.e. the predictor variables were the 0.3-power of the number of acknowledgements and a binary variable indicating the presence or absence of three or more suppressions. A linear regression was performed of the rate of noncooperation on the functions of acknowledgements and suppressions. Suppressions were a significant predictor of the rate of noncooperation (p = 3.7e-7; coefficient = 0.74), as was the intercept (p = 0.004; coefficient = 0.42). The role of the intercept is probably related to characteristics of the sample of encounters, which had a higher representation of unilaterally completed encounters and of the use of force than holds for the universe of police/civilian encounters in the three locations where these encounters were recorded, and thus may not generalize. Acknowledgements were marginally significant (p = 0.056;

coefficient = -0.165). We also examined a linear regression that included an interaction term between suppressions and acknowledgements but that was not significant (nor, when the interaction was present, were acknowledgements, p = 0.32).

A plot of the model predictions using only the transformations of acknowledgements and suppressions as predictors is shown in Figure 2. The model indicates that the presence or absence of (three or more) suppressions in an encounter dominates and the rate of noncooperation is high if there are three or more suppressions. Acknowledging civilian initiating actions appears to slightly decrease the rate of noncooperation.

Figure 2. Linear prediction model of rate of noncooperation given suppressions and acknowledgements in broad police encounters. The red curve models the rate of noncooperation when there are three or more suppressions in the encounter; the green curve models the rate of noncooperation when there are two or fewer suppressions in the encounter

Another view of the data is presented in Figure 3, which shows the (transformed) rate of noncooperation plotted for encounters which do or do not have three or more suppressions present.

Figure 3. Rate of noncooperation vs. presence or absence of (three or more) suppressions in police encounters (the values for the presence or absence of suppressions had small random numbers added so as to make the numbers of events more visible along the x-axis)

Examining the model residuals led to the following observations. At a given level of noncooperation, the residuals are generally greater when there's no suppression than when there is suppression. Clearly, the counts of acknowledgements are not a very good predictor on their own when there's no suppression. This may be because some acknowledgements are "higher quality" or more effective than others, although we are treating both a full response and explanation, and a very brief response containing only the information that the initiating action was heard and registered, as equivalent acknowledgements. The residuals also suggest that there may be other phenomena that play a role and that are more visible when there is no suppression. Overall, the residuals are larger when the rate of noncooperation is higher. This is compatible with the conclusion that the more noncooperative an encounter is, the more likely one or more other factors will play a role in addition to acknowledgements and suppressions.

Finally the third hypothesis pertaining to civilian involvement in an encounter was that suppressions and acknowledgements of civilian initiating actions would have a near-term impact on civilians' responses to requests for cooperation. The second hypothesis above describes a relationship with noncooperation within the encounter as a whole, while this third hypothesis predicts that there will be an immediate, local effect on cooperation. The hypothesis was operationalized as follows: if there are an acknowledgement or a suppression and an institutional representative-provided opportunity for cooperation

separated by 10 seconds or less (in either order, but with no intervening codes), and then within 15 seconds there is either a cooperation by the civilian or a pursuit or unilateral completion by the institutional representative, a pursuit or unilateral completion is more likely if the antecedent event was a suppression than if it was an acknowledgement. The counts of events are given in Table 4 for the coded broad police encounters.

Table 4. Counts of acknowledgement or suppression events shortly before cooperation, pursuit, or unilateral completion events in the police encounters

	Before near-term cooperation	Before near-term pursuit by officer	Before near-term unilateral completion by officer
Acknowledgement	87	5	1
Suppression	29	16	2

The hypothesis was that the proportion of pursuits and unilateral completions would be higher after a suppression than after an acknowledgement. This was tested and confirmed with a one-sided two-sample test of equality of proportions ($p = 3.7e\text{-}6$). This can also be viewed as a probability of near-term cooperation given a preceding suppression of 0.62, compared to a probability of near-term cooperation given a preceding acknowledgement of 0.94. This translates to 1.5 times greater odds of near-term cooperation given a preceding acknowledgement versus a preceding suppression.

Thus, the hypotheses about the positive effect of allowing or encouraging civilian contributions to an encounter were confirmed, whether the outcome was the overall project completion, the rate of noncooperation throughout the encounter, or the probability of cooperation with any one given opportunity for civilian cooperation. A fourth hypothesis, about the effect of disengaged body behavior or disengaged eye gaze in military encounters, was not confirmed.

Analog to Gottman's RCISS measure

In the course of research on interactions between married couples, Dr. John Gottman has developed a Rapid Couples Interaction Scoring System (RCISS), which uses codes reflecting the affect being expressed by each interacting partner. In RCISS, a cumulative sum of weighted affect codes is plotted over time during an interaction; the weights are empirically derived based on each affect code's power and positive or negative valence in predicting divorce or marriage continuity. The RCISS curves can give a rapid visualization of whether divorce or marriage continuity is predicted. The question was raised of whether an analogous measure could be created for encounters between police or warfighters and civilians.

As a very early pilot, we created an analog for the police/civilian encounters using what we learned from the hypothesis testing described above. We assigned positive and negative weights to codes relating to civilian involvement; these weights were based on informed guesses but were not derived in any formal manner or tuned for best

predictions. The weights assigned for each code are listed in Table 5. We were interested in whether a cumulative sum of these weights would relate to whether the encounter's project was cooperatively or unilaterally accomplished, as one proxy for a successful or less successful encounter.

Table 5. Codes and assigned weights for predicting encounter success

Code	Assigned weight
Cooperation by civilian	+0.5
Acknowledgement of civilian initiating action	+0.2
Pursuit by institutional representative	-0.5
Suppression of civilian initiating action	-1
Unilateral completion by institutional representative	-3

We applied these weights to the codes found in two police encounters, which were chosen merely by seeking one encounter that went well and one that did not. Both encounters ended in the arrest of the civilian, but in one the civilian cooperates with the arrest and in the other he clearly does not. The RCISS-analog curves derived from these two encounters are shown in Figure 4. We believe these are very promising. Again, these weights are not yet tuned, many relevant interactional phenomena are not included, and the figure shows only two encounters, but those encounters were chosen only on the basis of whether they seemed to go well or not and were the first and only two the curves were plotted for. Cooperative or unilateral project completion seems to be a very reasonable analog to marriage continuity or divorce for the domain of police and military encounters, and other outcome metrics can also be explored.

Figure 4. Summary over time of positive and negative events occurring throughout two encounters, both of which end in an arrest. The green dotted curve represents an encounter with a cooperatively accomplished outcome; the red curve represents an encounter with a unilaterally accomplished outcome.

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